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One of the proxies for the success of a corporate strategy is firm performance. This 
is because “performance is a surrogate for the alignment between an organization’s 
internal processes (strategy, structure, etc) and the external environment.”1 Business 
excellence therefore hangs together with the attainment of such an alignment. It is 
two of the processes that support such an alignment between customer and 
supplier that are the subject of this paper. The processes in question are so called 
“Key Account Management” (KAM) and competitive intelligence (CI). 
Definition of Key Account Management 
Key account management is the “speak[ing] to the large, complex, 
strategic customer in one voice which represents the full capabilities of 
the supplier[…]The objective is the true definition of “win-win” – to 
determine how the supplier can help the customer grow its business 
AND grow their  own business at the same time.”2 
Definition of Competitive Intelligence 
“Als "Competitive Intelligence" (CI) wird somit der systematische Prozess 
der Informationserhebung und -analyse bezeichnet, durch den aus 
fragmentierten (Roh-)Informationen über Märkte, Wettbewerber und 
Technologien den Entscheidern ein plastisches Verständnis für ihr 
Unternehmensumfeld und damit eine Entscheidungsgrundlage geliefert 
wird.”3 
                                      
1 Subramanian R., IsHak S., Competitor Analysis Practices of US Companies, 1998, S.13 
2 Napolitano L, Customer Supplier Partnering, 2007, S.3 




The proposal that will be presented in this paper is that that alignment process 
occurs through a series of stages. These stages are: 
1. The creation of a “vision” for the future of the business 
2. Out of this flows a corporate strategy 
3. The translation of the corporate strategy into action via the setting of goals 
and objectives 
4. Execution of the strategy 
5. Feedback 
Figure 1 below illustrates a generic strategic planning process. “Assess internal and 
external environment” corresponds to stage 1, “strategic direction” to stage 2, 
“define and select base strategy and contingency plans” to stage 3, “implement 
policy and strategy program” to stage 4, and “evaluate performance” to stage 5.  
                                
Figure 1. 
It is the author’s argument in this paper that a superficial evaluation of the strategic 
planning process, as it is illustrated in figure 1 above, misses some important 
subtleties that are key to full supplier-customer alignment and strategic success. 
Specifically, although much of the strategic planning literature has focused on 
stages 2 and 3, it is in fact aspects of stages 1 and 5 which are actually crucial to 
alignment and good strategy formulation. Figure 2 below gives a broad overview of 

























Figure 2 introduces business intelligence (BI) and “voice-of-the-customer” (VOC) to 
the equation.  
Definition of BI: „Business intelligence (BI) bezeichnet einen integrierten, 
unternehmensspezifischen, IT-basierten Gesamtansatz zur betrieblichen 
Entscheidungsunterstützung.“4 
Definition of VOC: “Aus[„voice-of-the-customer“]werden bezogen auf 
den Wertschöpfungsprozess die Kriterien (CTQs) abgeleitet, die für den 
Kunden die höchste Priorität bei der Beurteilung der Qualität der 
gelieferten Marktleistungen besitzen.“5 
                                      
4 Kemper, Baars et al., Business Intelligence, 2010, S.9 





“Quality of strategic thinking” in figure 2 correponds to Stage 1. The construct 
“Business intelligence” (BI) (whose inputs in part are CI and VOC) in figure 2 
corresponds to Stage 5. It is the author’s proposition that both the quality of 
competitive intelligence and direct feedback from the customer through the six-
sigma “voice-of-the-customer” (VOC) process, are extremely important inputs to 
high quality “business intelligence” (BI) which, in turn, is the most important input 
to the quality of strategic thinking, the precursor to the formulated strategy. While 
it will be argued that there is a role for a professional CI function in its own right, it 
will be further postulated that, via a variety of mechanisms to be explored in this 
paper, that it is the performance outcomes with customers which dictate a lot of 
the quality of CI and VOC. It will further be postulated that the quality of 
performance outcomes is directly influenced by key account management. In a 
sense, the author’s proposition is that professional CI and KAM functions act as 
metaphorical “kick-starts” to the bringing to rotation of the circular process 
illustrated in figure 2 above. The process illustrated in figure 2 is a virtuous circle in 
that once a critical degree of process quality is reached, this circular process starts 
to internally generate higher quantities and quality of both CI, VOC and thus BI, 
reinforcing quality of strategy and the level of supplier-customer alignment. It 
implies a focus on strategic execution and information inputs that were traditionally 
not the main focus of a lot of the strategic planning literature. This proposition is 
the justification for the focus of this paper being the contribution of KAM (strategic 
execution process) and CI (strategic information) to the quality of corporate 
strategy. 
A corporate strategy is a success if it aligns the supplier’s strategy and structure to 
its external environment. Some general principles involved here will be introduced 








Definition of Corporate Strategy 
“Competitive strategy is a combination of the ends (goals) for which the 
firm is striving and the means (policies) by which it is seeking to get 
there.”6 
Strategic decisions are so important because they “are far more rare, have larger 
implications for the ongoing competitiveness of the firm, impact more subsequent 
decisions, and are more difficult to reverse than decisions of a more operational or 
tactical nature.”7 Strategic decision making that takes into account some of the tried 
and tested principles of strategy is therefore important because of the dire 
consequences of rashness. One of these principles involves the search for so-called 
value chain linkages. 
Definition of the Value Chain 
“Jedes Unternehmen ist eine Ansammlung von Tätigkeiten, durch die 
sein Produkt entworfen, hergestellt, vertrieben, ausgeliefert und 
unterstützt wird.”8 
Definition of Value Chain Linkages 
„Verknüpfungen sind die Beziehungen, die zwischen einer Wertaktivität 
und den Kosten und der Durchführung einer anderen bestehen.“9 
It is the effectiveness of the supplier’s value chain relative to the effectiveness of 
that of the general industry in supporting the customer, which highlights the firm’s 
strengths and opportunities. It is the taking seriously of the task of searching, in an 
insightful rather than superficial manner for such value chain linkages, which is of 
such great importance. Of Porter’s competitive five forces, it has often been the so 
called “power of substitutes” which have devastated an unprepared industry. 
                                      
6 Porter M.E., Competitive Strategy, 1998, S.xxiv 
7 Fleisher C., Bensoussan B., Strategic and Competitive Analysis, 2003, S.4 
8 Porter M.E., Wettbewerbsvorteile, 1999, S.67 




However, customer centered innovation ensures that we are satisfying the basic 
need better than any competitor or any substitute product. The resources the firm 
may possess to make that a reality may be strong relational skills and strong 
relationships within a network in the market. Here, potent relational skills (including 
key account management skills) and professional CI programs can be effective 
resources. Being in a position to discover those basic needs and opportunities has 
proven difficult because efforts have often fallen foul of what Mintzberg calls the 
fallacy of formalization and detachment. This is the idea, that the formation of a 
strategic vision can be achieved by anyone, including formal strategic planners, as 
long as that person is supplied with sufficient data analysis. “Formalization implies a 
rational sequence, from analysis through administrative procedure to eventual 
action. But strategy making as a learning process can proceed in the other direction 
too. We think in order to act, to be sure, but we also act in order to think.”10The 
implication here is that only those who carry out the running of the business, i.e. 
the line managers, have the opportunity to “learn by doing” and as such should be 
the source of the strategy.11 Strategic planning is a process of synthesis, most 
complex in nature, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative inputs and requiring 
knowledge. Mintzberg concludes that a formal system can never replace the spark 
of intuitive genius that can combine all these inputs into a strategic vision. He also 
concludes, that it is likely that only strategic practitioners will have a chance of 
combining all these necessary qualities in one person. 
In identifying and taking advantage of value chain linkages, as well as dealing with 
some of the five forces of competition, the relational view of the firm, sees that firm 
strengths or resources can be present in a strategic partnership with another 
company and that these additional resources can be used to reinforce existing 
resources and make the taking advantage of potential value chain linkages a 
possibility. The relational view of the enterprise will be compared with the other 
                                      
10 Mintzberg H., The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, 1994, S.111 




types of view: the classical view; the behavioral view; and the resource-based view. 
With the advent of the internet, and particularly Web 2.0 based internet 
functionality, the relational view encompasses a new approach to marketing, where 
the customer is seen as the co-developer and co-creator of not only the product 
but also the marketing message. The studies on key account management highlight 
that its emergence is associated with a rise in competition, business complexity and 
a heightened need for relationship coordination. It is postulated in this paper that 
not only will involvement by a firm in strategic networks and partnerships raise a 
firm’s ability to deal with the five competitive forces,  but that the establishment of 
a well resourced KAM function will support the functioning of these partnerships 
and likely make them more successful. From there it will be postulated that 
membership in a strategic network of partnerships will, ceteris paribus, lead to 
higher firm performance. In regards one of the prerequisites of KAM success being 
top management support, the link between KAM, strategic network membership 
and firm performance will be analyzed within the framework of the so-called 
“service-profit chain” proposed by Heskett et al. 
Definition of the “service-profit chain” 
“The service-profit chain establishes relationships between profitability, 
customer loyalty, and employee satisfaction, loyalty, and productivity.”12 
 
In summary, there appears to be a strong interrelatedness of the following concepts: 
Quality of business intelligence (a construct contributed to by both qualitative (e.g. 
competitive intelligence (CI)) and quantitative (e.g. e-business) information input), 
quality of strategic thinking, vision and execution (Mintzberg, 1994). The quality of 
network partnerships appears to have both a direct bearing on strategy 
development via the identification of value chain linkages (Porter, 2000) and also an 
indirect effect via the rise in quality of CI associated with the occupation by a firm 
                                      




of “an information rich position within a network” (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Effective 
network partnerships appear to be an important tool in business transformation 
and continued excellence (Dittrich, Duysters, de Man, 2007). Key account 
management, in contrast, appears to make a contribution at the levels of both 
strategic execution and in the support of the gathering of CI (Wengler, Ehret, Saab, 
2005). A mind-map of the postulated interrelationships is presented in figure 3 
below: 































 It is posited in the paper that the KAM function is a business leader function, and 
the management of key accounts corresponds to the running of a mini-business 




important for the business as a whole, and the process of doing this effectively is 
prone to the same limitations / needs for quality input. It is therefore postulated 
that, just as for the business as a whole: 
Hypothesis H1: A key account program will have a greater effect in raising 
profitability if preceded by the successful implementation of a professional 
competitive intelligence function. 
It is further posited that, through the firm’s raised financial performance resulting 
from the successful implementation of a KAM program (the resulting market 
success making it a more attractive partner), as well as the firm’s heightened ability 
through having established key account relationships to identify value chain 
linkages that subsequently support the drive to form strategic networks: 
Hypothesis H2: The establishment of a successful key account program is an 
important driving factor in the later development of a successful strategic network 
in which the firm takes up membership and operates. 
It is finally further posited that the membership in a strategic network raises the 
firm’s ability still further to identify and execute new value chain linkages that bring 
efficiencies in both cost savings and sales growth, and as a result of the firm having 
taken-up “an information-rich position within a network”13, an associated rise in the 
quality of competitive intelligence, which in turn, as a key input into business 
intelligence, raises the quality of strategic thinking. The final postulate is therefore 
that: 
Hypothesis H3: Companies operating in successful strategic networks remain in 
growth and growing profits for longer consistent periods than companies in the 
same industry and of a similar size that do not. 
Given that firm performance is a good proxy for the success of corporate strategy, 
the confirmation of all three of the hypotheses would confirm the importance to 
                                      




corporate strategy development of KAM and CI, as well as confirm the mechanisms, 
as indicated in the mind map, by which they provide such support.  
1.1 Thesis Structure 
This paper is broken into eight further sections. In section two we will look at what 
key account management is and why it comes about. In section three we will do 
the same for competitive intelligence and test the hypothesis that a pre-requisite 
for a successful key-account program is the prior institution of a professional 
competitive intelligence function within the firm. In section four we will look at the 
subject of corporate strategy, and specifically the ground rules for how a strategy 
should be developed and researched and the basic types that most strategies have 
to correspond to, in order to have a chance of success. From there we look at how 
the over-arching strategy types are translated down to concrete steps at the firm 
level and start to see how the concept of linking or partnering tends to accompany 
much of the efforts to execute a strategy. An additional subject in this section will 
be to look at strategy making in its essence and the argument that strategy making 
needs to be practitioner based and cannot be taken and turned into an isolated 
scientific process. In section five we approach the concept that firm success is the 
result of the alignment of firm resources with the outside world and review the 
place of six-sigma within the total quality management framework of EFQM-
Balanced scorecard-Six-sigma (philosophy-goals-execution). Section five is thus all 
about how supplier-customer alignment comes about, and the framework provided 
by six-sigma such that all the activities of the business are customer focused. 
Section six puts key account management within the wider framework of 
relationship management generally, first by analyzing the angles from which a firm 
can be viewed, and out of these developing the relational view to better explain the 
basic needs being fulfilled by key account management. Customer relationship 




the business in its quest to pick “key” accounts. Section seven looks at the growth 
of strategic networks as a way to organize the value chain, and classifies these nets 
by a number of criteria. The cooperation associated with co-creation will be looked 
at associated with the rise of Web 2.0 and its effect on the organization of 
marketing going forwards. The rise in the requirement to increase levels of 
coordination of such complex relationship networks will be investigated by 
exploring a hypothesis that the chances of the successful operation of a firm within 
a strategic network is heightened if this is preceded by the instatement of a key 
account program. The reasoning behind this is that modern business networks are 
associated with heightened levels of relationship complexity along with a 
heightened need for relationship coordination. Rises in complexity and the need to 
increase relationship coordination have both been shown in independent research 
to be drivers for the increased use of key account management. Section eight 
addresses the subject of whether involvement in strategic networks promotes better 
firm performance than non involvement in such networks. The reason for pursuing 
this hypothesis is that if it can be shown that CI supports KAM supports success in 
networks, then networks supporting firm performance would show one of the 
causal chains through which CI and KAM both have a positive effect on firm 





2 Key Account Management (KAM) 
2.1 What is Key Account Management? 
Key account management is described as “an important approach to creating value, 
by implementing specific processes targeting most important customers.”14 It is the 
implementation of the relationship marketing approach, the philosophy behind 
customer relationship marketing (CRM), focused on one account. It is associated 
with business to business relationships of both great potential and complexity 
within a very competitive environment. These sorts of relationships are 
characterized by requiring higher than average levels of coordination to manage. 
Empirical studies have identified a correlation between levels of coordination 
required in the relationship, levels of competition and the implementation of key 
account management.15   
2.1.1 Why does it come about? 
There are many important influences on the economy that are leading the intensity 
of competition and the complexities of doing business to both increase. These 
effects are social, legal, economic and technological factors. Social factors such as 
changes in life-style, demographics and wealth distribution are leading to a rapid 
change in what sorts of goods and services are being demanded and by whom. 
Legal factors, such as health and safety and environmental legislation as well as 
legislation to protect privacy and personal data, also play their part. Demographic 
                                      
14 Wengler et al., Implementation of Key Account Management, 2005, S.103 




factors such as the increase in average age of western Europeans affect the types of 
goods and services demanded. The shift in wealth and thus economic power, from 
western Europe and North America to the B.R.I.C. nations, will affect the location 
and nature of the largest markets for goods and services, and finally the 
development of the internet makes almost every geographical market around the 
globe accessible to all, thus increasing the density of competitors and intensity of 
competitive rivalry globally. In addition, internet related technology developments 
have enabled an unparalleled increase in both mobile communications and data 
exchange with an attendant realm of new product possibilities and business models 
accompanying this technological development. These basic developments have led 
to yet other developments in, for example, the structure of many markets. As the 
stakes and also levels of competitive rivalry in markets have, as a result of the 
above, increased, there has been much consolidation in markets, and many firms 
have either exited markets or been taken over.16 Key account management as a 
concept has been recognized and practiced since the 1960’s, however the increase 
in percentage of companies practicing, or professing to practice key account 
management has dramatically increased in the last decade. This development is 
closely related to the increase in levels of competition in markets and rising levels 
of complexity in doing business caused by the factors described above.17 Key 
account management is an answer to rising requirements for the coordination of 
highly complex business relationships in very competitive markets.18 The forces at 
work within markets, as well as the level of the stakes, have meant that in order to 
compete, there is a necessity to make strategic investments. Such investments are 
wrought with uncertainty. The readiness to make such strategic investments is 
increased if uncertainty of information is decreased. In addition, where technological 
                                      
16 Vgl. Fleisher C., Bensoussan B., Strategic and Competitive Analysis, 2003, SS.7-8 
17 Vgl. Gueselaga R., Johnston W., What’s next in key account management research?, 2010, 
S.1063 





change is the driver of new product development, the influencing of or actual 
setting of standards at an early stage in the new technology’s development also 
reduces uncertainty.19 However this can rarely be done by one company alone and 
often calls for coalitions of partnering companies to work together in order to 
achieve this. The development of partnerships is a mechanism for the reduction of 
such uncertainty. The partnering of customers and suppliers is a particularly 
important example of such a relationship, and the work of the key account 
manager, as the manager of such relationships, is therefore of exceptional 
importance to a business. 
2.1.2 The Connection to Relationship Management 
Key account management represents a movement away from transactional 
marketing to relationship marketing in the case of the business done with one 
particular account. As will be identified, the development of such relationships can 
become a sustained competitive advantage for the business. The sustained nature 
of such advantage emanates from the complexity and thus inimitability of such 
relationships if developed skillfully. The skill required rests to a great degree with 
the key account manager. In their 2006 paper, Plouffe and Barclay identify a 
particularly important skill and success factor associated with the most 
accomplished sale people which they call sales person navigation (SpN) skills.20 In 
this particular role, the key account manager acts as entrepreneur / intrapreneur by 
both identifying business development opportunities within the key account and 
identifying and procuring for themselves and their efforts, support from within their 
own firm. SpN skills are associated with the dual ability of being able to identify 
who within one’s own organization can best support the opportunity identified by 
                                      
19 Vgl. Möller K., Rajala A., Rise of Strategic Nets – New Modes of Value Creation, 2007, 
S.898 




the salesperson and then through skillful influencing, procure such support. Such 
support in its most effective form is in the form of sales and marketing resource 
allocation that supports the key account manager’s efforts. The key account 
manager is the weaver of relationships across the organizational boundary and 
within organizations. Such relationship management skills are the foundation of the 
beginnings of a partnership which with time will develop into a relationship of trust. 
Trust leads to the increases in cooperation, information exchange and joint 
investments that reduce un-certainty, streamline the exchange process and increase 
efficiencies in the management of such relationships, as will be discussed in section 
6.1.3 below. Trust is also the foundation of learning from customers which improves 
the chances of successful new product introduction.21  
2.1.3 The Key Objectives and thus Benefits of Key Account Management 
“The objective is the true definition of „win-win“ – to determine how the supplier 
can help the customer grow its business AND grow their own business at the same 
time.”22 This is how Lisa Napolitano the ex head of NAMA (National Account 
Managers Association) in her seminal 1997 article describes the main objective of 
key account management. Workman et al (2003) confirm this by stating that 
“Customers enter into collaborative relationships with suppliers in anticipation of 
receiving benefits such as better products and services, better pricing terms, 
improved logistics, and more information sharing than they would receive if they 
were not in such a relationship”23. The focus on building a strong working  
relationship between the supplier and its key customer is the vehicle that gets the 
two parties to the win-win situation that both Napolitano and Workman describe. A 
                                      
21 Vgl. Rodriguez et al., Can a good organizational climate compensate for a lack of top 
management commitment to new product development? 2008, S.121 
22 Napolitano L, Customer Supplier Partnering, 2007, S.3 
23 Workman et al., Intraorganizational Determinants of Key Account Management 




strong relationship depends upon openness, trust, reciprocity, understanding, 
shared goals and the desire on the part of the parties to form the relationship.  
The supplier’s objectives for developing the key account relationship have been 
identified as: 
 Protecting existing volume base 
 Realizing incremental volume 
 Increasing account penetration 
 Increasing market penetration 
 Gaining operational efficiencies 
 Gaining competitive advantage 
 Product development ideas 
 Greater customer loyalty24 
The benefits to the customer of entering into such a key account relationship with 
its supplier(s) are: 
 Better service 
 Faster communication 
 Better / faster decisions 
 Easy access to supplier 
 Better supplier knowledge 
 Greater Trust 
 Continuity 
 Greater security25 
Some of the factors that have been identified as key to the success of a key 
account relationship are the factors that contribute towards the success of any 
mutual relationship. Such factors are also the foundation of the achievement of  
both side’s objective(s) (above) in the key account relationship. 
                                      
24 Vgl. Napolitano L, Customer Supplier Partnering, 1997, S.2 




The factors identified as necessary for the attainment of such benefits are: 
 Getting the choosing of the right customer(s) with which to develop key 
account relationships right. The objective is to correctly identify potential 
candidate accounts. Not only such factors as the strategic importance of the 
account for the industry but also the compatibility of the target account’s 
needs with our core strengths as well as the compatibility of the two 
corporate cultures are needed for the relationship to develop through 
effective communication and fulfillment of both parties’ needs. Also there 
must be a desire to form such a relationship on the part of the target.26 
 Understanding of the key customer’s business. It has been shown in a 
number of studies that the ability of the supplier to understand the key 
account’s business and thus to pro-actively make win-win suggestions are of 
great importance to the esteem in which a supplier will be held by its 
customer. This addresses the aspects of understanding and shared goals that 
are so important in a relationship. Understanding and pro-activeness would 
indicate the importance that business intelligence and particularly 
competitive intelligence can play in the development of win-win scenarios 
and profitable key account relationships.27 
 Top management commitment to the key account relationship. This has 
been identified as being one of the most important drivers of success in 
developing key account relationships. The top management commitment 
helps ensure goal alignment within the supplier such that the supplier 
applies the resources and the coordinated responses needed to support the 
key account manager.28 
 Human aspects. A corporate culture that encourages team working and 
cooperation within the supplier will encourage the development of the team 
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network necessary to develop the coordinated responses from the supplier 
that the key account requires. Team working throughout the organization is 
important, but Workman et al. identify that particularly a good “esprit de 
corp” (team spirit) amongst the sales staff of the supplier is of huge 
importance to making the key account relationship work. Having the right 
person as the key account manager is of key importance here, as they will 
be the one to weave and manage the web of relationships that when 
effective, make key account relationships a success. Some of the qualities 
looked for in the high performing key account manager are being a good 
administrator, communicator, consultant, diplomat, leader, missionary, 
motivator, negotiator, ombudsman, organizer, problem solver, professional, 
relationship builder, strategist, trainer and visionary.29  
 Having a master plan. Coordinated efforts require a plan to work to. Having 
a well thought through and communicated master-plan for the development 
of a key account is of importance to enable top management to support the 
development of the account. Only if a plan can be communicated will top 
management support be effective. Only with the existence of a plan can 
work be organized and progress measured. A plan also indicates to the key 
account how committed the supplier is and this generates trust in the 
relationship.30  
 An open relationship. Having an open and frank dialogue is the pre-requisite 
for the supplier and its key account to make progress in learning about one 
another’s needs such that truly win-win solutions in the form of new 
products and services can be developed, as well as new mutually beneficial 
ways of working implemented.  
The development of the above success factors is a mutually reinforcing process, in 
that success in the development of one of the factors supports the successful 
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development of one or more of the others. An example of such a reinforcing 
interrelationship, are the factors “Openness of relationship” and “Having a Master 
Plan”. Having a master plan encourages trust which itself encourages relationship 
openness which in turn increases the quality of the master-plan.   
 
2.1.4 How Modern IT Supports the Attainment of such Benefits 
2.1.4.1 E-Business 
E-business is the “teilweise[n][…][bzw.] vollständige[n] Unterstützung, Abwicklung 
und Aufrechterhaltung von Leistungsaustauschprozessen mittels elektronischer 
Netze“31. Figure 4 below illustrates how e-business is the process of attaining supply 
















                                      





The full sharing of information required for coordinating a supply-chain is a goal 
supported by research that shows that a closer working together promotes supply-
chain efficiency. A practical example of how such closeness of cooperation and 
exchange of information can lead to cost savings in the supply-chain, is in the 
avoidance of the so-called “bull-whip-effect” in inventory management.32 The bull-
whip-effect is a phenomenon where demand changes at one end of the supply 
chain lead to an over-reaction in levels of change in inventory at the other end of 
the chain, due to a time-delay in the transmission of information. The corollary of 
this is inefficient levels of inventory being held and the inability to react to changes 
in demand in the supply chain in a timely fashion, with the associated levels of 
waste and foregone revenues. Tight supply chain coordination (tight sharing of 
information throughout the supply chain) has been shown to reduce or even 
eliminate the bull-whip-effect. The bull-whip-effect found at the operational level, 
however, has its equivalents at the strategic level of organizational decision making. 
These strategic efficiency issues have to do with how capable organizations are in 
sensing potential changes in the market and customer requirements and how 
flexible and effective they are in reacting to such changes. Peter Drucker states that 
one of the strategic traps that many firms fall into is the one of “fighting the last 
war”, whereby companies continue to focus on issues that were important to their 
success, but which have long since been overtaken by newer more important 
ones.33 
 
2.1.4.2 E-Business and Cooperation and Coordination 
In terms of an organization‘s ability to perform, Sanders, in her 2007 paper, 
identifies a number of important factors associated with e-business implementation, 
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having a positive correlation with organizational performance. She defines business 
performance “as success relative to specifically set business goals”34. She proposes a 
model of how the use of e-business technologies, intra-organizational and inter-
organizational collaboration are related to organizational performance as it is 
defined above. Figure 5 below illustrates the postulated interrelationships. Below 
that, the hypotheses Sanders makes (H1 through H5) are listed. 

























H1: Firm use of e-business technologies has a direct and positive impact on 
 intra-organizational collaboration. 
H2: Firm use of e-business technologies has a direct and positive impact on 
 inter-organizational collaboration. 
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H3: Firm use of e-business technologies has a direct and positive impact on 
 organizational performance. 
H4: Inter-organizational collaboration has a direct and positive impact on intra-
 organizational collaboration. 
H5: Intra-organizational collaboration has a direct and positive impact on 
 organizational performance.35 
Sanders, as background to her research, identifies the following: 
 A number of studies indicate a positive relationship between firm 
implementation of IT and performance. Some of the mechanisms proposed 
are that investment in IT promotes intra-company collaboration which has 
been shown to positively impact performance and also that such 
investments in IT technology demonstrate to other supply chain members’ 
commitment. 
 Further studies indicated that while there is a direct impact of e-business 
technologies on firm performance, there was no clear interrelationship 
between inter-company collaboration and firm performance. 
 Still further studies identified a link between inter-company collaboration 
and intra-company collaboration. It appears that for inter-company 
collaboration to be successful, intra-company collaboration is required, 
because a supply chain doesn’t stop at the borders of companies but flows 
right through an organization and is embodied by inter-departmental 
collaboration within an enterprise as well as collaboration between 
enterprises. Without the one, the other cannot work. 
As a result of these insights, Sanders’ study attempts to analyze the components of 
collaboration and how specifically e-business technologies, through the various 
components of collaboration, influences firm performance. Her study’s contribution 
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to this field is that she uncovers that indirect effects of e-business technology on 
performance through enhanced collaboration come via the positive effects of e-
business technologies on intra-organizational collaboration. This occurs through a 
direct positive impact of e-business on intra-organizational collaboration and an 
indirect effect whereby e-business technologies enable inter-organizational 
collaboration which in turn promotes intra-organizational collaboration, which in 
turn has a positive effect on firm performance.  Her empirical research supported all 
five of her hypotheses, with H1 and H5 both being particularly strongly supported.36 
A corollary of her research is that companies are best served by developing intra-
company collaboration. This is an activity for organizational development specialists 
and e-business technology implementers, both working very closely together in 
order to make companies as fit as they can be for profitable inter-organizational 
collaboration.  
In her paper, Sanders sights the critique that some of her research respondents 
make of the operational nature of the variables she uses to measure collaboration 
(real-time sharing of operational information; real-time sharing of cross functional 
planning; engaging in collaborative planning and sharing cost information with 
suppliers). She goes on to say that further research should focus on the link 
between e-business technologies and more strategic levels of collaboration. Bughin 
and Chui in their 2011 paper report on a survey of “3249 executives across a range 
of regions, industries and functional areas”37 done by their consultancy McKinsey, 
on use of Web 2.0 by these companies. Their findings are in agreement with those 
of Sanders in that they identify that internal collaboration within organizations 
supported by networking technology was associated with a greater level of market 
share gain and increase in profitability than companies relatively early in the 
development of internal networking. However, significantly, they also identified that 
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organizations that were both more internally and externally networked had greater 
market share gains and profitability growth which they believe was being achieved 
“by forging closer marketing relationships with customers and by involving them in 
customer support and product-development efforts.”38 This seems to confirm that 
there is also a benefit to collaboration at the strategic level for more internally and 
externally networked enterprises. Web 2.0 technologies (a technology that allows 
information sharing just as e-business does) support the sharing of information and 
thus collaboration at all levels of the organization. The author extrapolates from 
that, that the construct “IT enabled information sharing” improves collaboration. E-
business is one level of such IT enabled information sharing. As part of a continuum 
from operational to strategic information processing and sharing, e-business plays 
its part in developing the mosaic of information that informs collaboration and 
collaborative decisions inside and between organizations. Given that, particularly 
such internal collaboration promotes firm performance enhancement, the author 
feels it can be said that the case for the importance of e-business in the whole 
process of the interaction with and development of customers has been made. This 
is confirmed by Bughin and Chui who report that “respondents at companies that 
used Web 2.0 to collaborate across organizational silos and to share information 
more broadly also reported improved market share.”39 In studies such as that of 
Wengler et al., the importance of coordination as a driver in the promotion of KAM 
is identified and thus the link between coordination / collaboration, e-business and 
factors which promote KAM can be seen in Sander’s study.  
 
                                      
38 Bughin J., Chui M., The Rise of the Networked Enterprise, 2010, S.6 




3 Competitive Intelligence (CI) 
3.1 Definition of CI 
There are a variety of approaches or emphases that have been taken to defining 
what competitive Intelligence (CI) is. Broadly speaking one can differentiate between 
CI as a process or as a product. The Society of Competitive Intelligence 
Professionals take a process approach, whereas Vedder and Guynes takes the 
product view. “Competitive intelligence can be defined in terms of both a process 
and a product. As a process, CI is the set of legal and ethical methods for 
collecting, developing, analyzing and disseminating actionable information 
pertaining to competitors, suppliers, customers, organization itself and business 
environment (Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals [SCIP] 2009). As a 
product, CI is actionable information about the present and future behavior of 
competitors, suppliers, customers, technologies, government, acquisitions, market 
and general business environment (Vedder and Guynes 2000).”40 One can also 
differentiate by the degree of actionability of the resulting CI output. Whereas 
Dishman and Caloff see the output as an assistance to strategic decision taking, 
“competitive intelligence is a process involving the gathering, analyzing, and 
communicating of environmental information to assist in strategic decision-making. 
As such, it is the fundamental basis of the strategic decision-making process”41, 
Michaeli views the output as having to provide the basis for a management 
decision,  ”als "Competitive Intelligence" (CI) wird somit der systematische Prozess 
der Informationserhebung und -analyse bezeichnet, durch den aus fragmentierten 
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(Roh-)Informationen über Märkte, Wettbewerber und Technologien den 
Entscheidern ein plastisches Verständnis für ihr Unternehmensumfeld und damit 
eine Entscheidungsgrundlage geliefert wird.”42 It is clear that CI is at once both a 
process and a product. The author views the quality of the basis of the information 
for decision making, however, as decisive, and a definition such as Michaeli’s that 
emphasizes this aspect would seem to be superior. Writers on the subject 
emphasize that it is the quality of the analysis within the CI process that is the 
decisive factor in its quality.43 
3.1.1 CI as a Component of Management Support Systems 
Von Blohn describes competitive intelligence as an information oriented 
management support system (MSS). This is in contrast to other more structured 
decision making tools based on a model or method, fed with quantitative 
information.44 CI information is primarily qualitative in nature and as such must be 
structured in a secondary step within a database. In figure 6 below a general 
structure of an MSS is shown, and the type of data management system used for 
the management of CI data highlighted. 
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The interface between human and machine is shown clearly within von Blohn’s 
model. The “Informationsgeneratoren” (generators of information) are the personnel 
gathering the CI. However, given that the information is weakly structured 
qualitative data, in a second step the data must be turned into information by 
structuring, sorting and analyzing its content. This analysis is also performed by the 
generators of information, the CI analyst team. The data is gathered on an 
“Informationsobjekt” (the object of research), which can be a customer, competitor, 
market, government, regulatory authority, potential new market entrant or anybody 
or thing else that could dramatically alter the competitive structure of an industry. 
The structured qualitative and quantitative intelligence information is loaded into an 
information database. The thus won CI can then be used to enrich other 
quantitative internal or external data generated by, for example, e-business 
applications to provide upper management with salient information for decision 




context in which to be judged.45 The thus combined information types (CI together 
with e-business generated (quantitative) information) form in totality what is called 
business intelligence in its wider sense.46 Figure 7 below shows the relationship of 
CI to the other inputs in the context of business intelligence (BI). 






Here, the operational systems and the external sources of data are the generators 
of information. The operational systems are the e-business systems in the modern 
company. External data is the CI. BI via the BI portal should form the information 
source that allows what the author will go on to describe as “strategic thinking” 
(see section 3), such strategic thinking being the starting point for the strategic 
planning process. 
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3.1.2 A Mind-Map Linking CI, E-business, BI, Strategy & KAM  
The author presents again below in figure 8, the mind-map (already presented in 
section 1), based on what has been discussed so far, of the interrelation of the 
topics introduced. It presents the author’s view of how these various areas / 
activities have the potential, when working in harmony, to enhance business 
performance. 
































One of the central themes in this paper will be that the quality of strategic thinking 
is an indispensible starting point for above average business performance.47 The 
input into the strategic thinking process is business intelligence, which means that 
high quality business intelligence is paramount to the firm even having a chance of 
developing a good strategy. (In section 4 we will explore what a strategy is and 
                                      




what makes a strategy good.) Good business intelligence has as its inputs, 
competitive intelligence which is structured and analyzed qualitative data, e-
business quantitative data and voice of the customer (VOC) input on the factors 
critical to quality (CTQ’s) from our most important customers’ standpoint. A vision is 
only possible with informed and sharp strategic thinking. This means seeing the 
fundamentals of what moves a market as opposed to others only seeing today’s 
activities.48 As will be elaborated further, it is important to see not only what is 
happening, but why it is happening. Only from that can a vision of a “quality” 
business be grasped. The EFQM model of business excellence provides the 
overarching principles by which this should be done, and from there a balanced 
scorecard can be used for the setting down of specific tasks and goals to be met.49 
Amongst such tasks will be the forming of lucrative relationships with key 
customers. Via the development of such relationships, the generation of a self-
reinforcing (or a virtuous) circle of continuously improving information and strategic 
fit can start to develop as, via voice of the customer (VOC) activity, the quality of 
input feeding back into business intelligence improves and thus too the quality of 
strategic thinking. A second virtuous circle can also develop, namely the one of 
generating strategic partnerships in networks as a result of a better understanding 
(through working with key accounts) of important value chain linkages (between us 
and the key account and between us and others of the key account’s suppliers). 
Increasing the quality and strength (and to a degree) quantity of strategic 
partnerships increases the quality of, and access to, competitive intelligence. This is 
due to the firm taking-up “an information rich position within[a]network”50. 
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3.1.3 The role of CI 
It is important to differentiate between two concepts, competitor intelligence and 
competitive intelligence. Benjamin Gilad, the President of the Academy of 
Competitive intelligence, says that what many of the companies that so-say practice 
competitive intelligence actually do, is competitor intelligence. Competitor 
intelligence is competitor watching.51 Gilad goes on to say that some of the 
companies that have practiced very close competitor watching (he gives the 
example of General Motors) have been examples of spectacular corporate failure. 
He argues that such watching is unhelpful as it leads to a herd mentality with 
closely matched competitors emulating each other’s mistakes, while missing the 
truly important developments that are occurring. The true nature of competitive 
intelligence should be to identify fundamental changes in the dynamics of markets 
(Gilad takes the example of the rise in traffic density and increase in working 
women generating a ready market for smaller more fuel efficient vehicles in the 
USA, which was completely overlooked (originally) by Detroit). Porter states that 
one of the most pressing needs for good CI is to be able to identify substitute 
products that may displace the currently supplied products in an industry, before 
their effect hits home. What has been described above is the quality that CI has to 
possess to be a good input to strategic thinking. There is indeed another benefit 
that good CI should bring. This additional benefit should be that we develop an 
understanding of our customer’s business almost as good as that of our customer. 
If the quality of CI attains that level, then we are almost in a position to second 
guess our customer’s needs – know his or her needs, or at least be able to 
verbalize them, before the customer can. Such a quality level of CI and resulting 
customer knowledge represents a devastating sales tool. A salesperson that is able 
to present to their customer a particular unfulfilled need that the customer may not 
yet have fully realized but in the course of the meeting is able to persuade them of 
its existence and at the same time show them a proven solution, is much more 
                                      




likely to both make a sale and strengthen their relationship with the customer than 
a salesperson that cannot. This thought takes us on to the next section, the 
relationship between competitive intelligence and key account management (KAM). 
3.1.4 The Relationship of CI to KAM 
The relationship of CI to KAM is quite a tight one. The reason for this is that the 
process of KAM can indeed be seen as the process of managing a business. 
Salojärvi, Sainio and Tarkiainen in their paper state that the key account manager 
must be someone in a position to manage a business roughly of the potential size 
to which the key account can grow.52 The broadness of vision that a key account 
manager must have is driven home by “the realization that a “competitor”, in fact, is 
any entity that wants access to your profit margin, be it a traditional competitor, a 
supplier, a customer, or a government agency.”53 The key account manager must be 
at once both an entrepreneur and also adept at developing networks throughout 
their own organization to ensure that an identified need is appropriately 
approached by their own organization. Both activities require skills identified by 
Plouffe and Barclay as “Sales Person Navigation” skills54 and identified as 
“intrapreneurial ability” by Workman, Homburg and Jensen55. Perhaps, though, the 
decisive ability is being able to understand the customer, and the customer’s 
business, as well as the customer understands these themselves. Workman, 
Homburg and Jensen in their comprehensive study on the intra-organizational 
factors contributing to KAM effectiveness identify that “effective salespeople 
understand how their customers make decisions and adjust their efforts 
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accordingly[..].”56 Some of the advantages that a deeper understanding of the 
customer and their business brings to KAM can be listed as follows: 
 Activity pro-activeness. Activity pro-activeness brings two distinct benefits: 
First mover advantage which means the best relationships are struck-up first 
and the best learning opportunities are taken advantage of earlier. Second 
the KAM has a better chance to steer the relationship when taking the 
initiative with the key account rather than when caught on the back foot, 
responding to key account requests.57  
 Market Intelligence. “Market intelligence means we have a deep 
understanding of the entire process of how the account makes money.”58 
 Financial Intelligence. “Financial intelligence means the SAM has a deep 
understanding of the entire process of allocating and spending money 
within the strategic account.”59 
 Organizational Intelligence. “Organizational intelligence means the SAM has 
a deep understanding of the structure of the organization and the structure 
of the departments that can influence decisions to allocate and spend 
money on the SAM’s products and services.”60 
 Operational Intelligence. “Operational intelligence means the SAM has a 
deep understanding of how the operating departments use the SAM’s 
products and services to produce operating results.”61 
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 Personnel Intelligence. “Personnel intelligence means the SAM has a deep 
understanding of the people within the strategic account that can influence 
buying decisions.”62 
 Competitor Intelligence. “Competi[tor] intelligence means the SAM has a 
deep understanding of his or her own current standing within the account 
and the standing of all competitors.”63 
3.1.4.1 Hypothesis H1: A key account program will have a greater 
effect in raising profitability if preceded by the successful 
implementation of a professional competitive intelligence 
function. 
 
From the literature there appear to be two distinct mechanisms whereby CI can 
have a positive effect on firm profitability via a positive interaction with KAM. Firstly, 
effective CI will help us choose the best key accounts to be working with. Secondly, 
the intimate knowledge of the drivers of the customer’s business that effective CI 
bestows, means that the key account manager will be far more effective in winkling 
out opportunities for new business within the KAM and far more effective at closing 
new deals with the KAM, than those key account managers that do not have access 
to good CI. While the author was unable to find a study that directly linked the 
introduction of a professional CI program to the success of a key account program 
in raising profitability, the author did find many pieces of research that  
1. Show that the introduction of a professional CI program has a positive effect 
on firm profitability (Subramanian & IsHak 1998) 
2. Show that the introduction of a professional CI program has a positive effect 
on the success of a key account program (Workman, Homburg & Jensen 
2003) 
                                      
62 Hodgdon B., Strategic Account Intelligence, 2002, S.35 




3. Show that a successful key account program has a positive effect on firm 
profitability (Workman, Homburg & Jensen 2003) 
Although the author was unable to uncover any research that proved a causal link 
via key account management of the positive effect of a professional CI function on 
firm profitability, the research uncovered leads us to conjecture that such a 
relationship does exist. A recommendation for future research would be to 
investigate such a causal link further.64 
Subramanian and IsHak performed a study in 1998 whereby “85 firms from 
BusinessWeek’s America’s 1000 Most Valuable Companies were used to describe 
the current practices in competitor analysis and to test a hypothesis relating 
performance to competitor analysis phase.”65 The key result from their study was 
that “[f]irms having advanced systems to monitor their competitors’ activities 
exhibited greater profitability than firms that did not have such systems.”66 The 
measure used predominantly for company performance is return on assets (ROA), 
and it was ROA that was used in Subramanian and IsHak’s study. In preface to their 
study, Subramanian and IsHak explain “the rationale for examining this 
relationship[the connection between the possession of an advanced CI function and 
superior firm performance]is that performance is a surrogate for the alignment 
between an organization’s internal processes (strategy, structure, etc) and the 
external environment.”67 Subramanian and IsHak’s sample of companies used in 
their study had the following descriptive characteristics (see table 1 below): 
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Subramanian and IsHak classified firms in the study according to the phase, or 
sophistication, of their CI function. “Firms in the study were classified as being in 
phase I stage (primitive), phase II stage (intermediate) and phase III stage 
(advanced) using the following characteristics: a distinct and separate group of 
people involved in the activity, frequency of competitor analysis, and a specific 
number of people dedicated to performing the activity. This was operationalized in 
the study by three separate questions. If the firm answered no to two or more 
questions, it was assigned to phase I; if it answered yes to only two of the three 
questions it was assigned to phase II; a firm was put in phase III only if it answered 
all three questions in the affirmative.”68  
The firm performance measure used was ROA, and specifically corporate ROA in 
comparison to the 3 year mean for the industry in which the firm operated. A low 
                                      




return on assets was below the industry 3 year mean and vice versa for a high 
return on assets. The results are shown in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. 
Subramanian and IsHak stated that there was a statistically supported positive 
relationship between firm performance and higher sophistication levels of CI in the 
85 firm sample.69 They also go on to point up a potentially synergistic relationship 
between quality of a sales organization and the gathering/quality of CI. “A firm’s 
salespeople play an external boundary spanning role (Pfeffer/Salancik 1978) and as 
such spend considerable amounts of time interfacing with their customers. It is 
logical to use them as a source of information about competitors.”70 
 
Workman, Homburg and Jensen in their 2003 paper posit that “activity 
proactiveness is positively related to KAM effectiveness”71. While they use the term 
activity proactiveness rather than CI, there are numerous papers written by 
practitioners that maintain that activity proactiveness depends entirely on good CI. 
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Bill Hodgdon, President of Hodgdon Consulting Services consulting in key account 
management practices states “[..]superior intelligence helps the SAM bring more of 
his or her own corporate resources to bear on the right people within the account 
at the right times.”72 Salojärvi, Sainio and Tarkiainen confirm this in their 2010 
paper. “Customer knowledge utilization could be considered as the driving force of 
key account management in that it lays the foundation for all strategic decision-
making concerning the key account relationship.”73 This concept is further 
confirmed by Abratt and Kelly in their 2002 paper. “Knowledge and understanding 
of the key account customer's business were viewed by both parties as very 
important. The primary reason for understanding the key account customer's 
business was to anticipate their future needs. Hannah noted that the understanding 
of the key account customer's business was a critical success factor in the KAM 
relationship.”74 The Workman, Homburg and Jensen 2003 study goes on to confirm 
that their “[h]ypothesis 2, which posits a relationship between activity proactiveness 
and KAM effectiveness, is also supported.”75 Finally, in regards to corporate 
profitability, the Workman, Homburg and Jensen 2003 study states that “[o]ur 
results also support our hypothesized relationships between KAM effectiveness, 
performance in the market, and profitability.”76 Thus, the author concludes that 
there is strong evidence that would point to the correctness of hypothesis H1. 
However to be able to confirm H1 with certainty, studies of the effect of the 
introduction of a key account program, with and without prior introduction of a 
professional CI function, on profitability would be needed. 
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4 Corporate Strategy 
4.1 What is a corporate strategy? 
A strategy is a way to achieve something. A corporate strategy is a way a company 
achieves something. “Strategic management is a way of conducting the 
organization that has as its ultimate objective the development of values, 
managerial capabilities, organizational responsibilities, and administrative systems 
that link strategic and operational decision making, at all hierarchical levels, and 
across all lines of authority.”77 Here we have already pointed up the fact that there 
are a number of things a company would like to do. This is the case because there 
are a number of people involved in the running of a company. Who are these 
people? These are its owners, its managers, its employees, its customers, its 
neighbors and society at large. All these people are collectively known as 
“stakeholders” in the business, and as their number and type are various, the goals 
of the business are therefore various.78 As what a company wants to achieve is a 
complex question to answer, many strategists have asked perhaps the simpler 
question “what is the company good at?” It seems logical that everyone in the 
company will enjoy doing something that they are good at. It also seems logical 
that the shareholders will be pleased if the company does something it is good at, 
as that way, the company and they are more likely to make money. Others outside 
the company, the company’s neighbors and customers will probably also be 
pleased, because somebody that does something they are good at will produce a 
high quality result which tends to be a benefit to all.79 There is nothing more 
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annoying for most stakeholders, than having to interface in some way with 
amateurs. The amateurish company / corporate management often acts in ways 
that makes the others of the company’s stakeholders bear the costs of their 
incompetence, even if this is only a short term phenomenon.80 It is therefore fair to 
say that a generic goal of a company is to find something to do that fits well with 
its abilities. If abilities (skills) can be classified as a resource amongst a range of 
other resources within a company, then one can say that finding something to do 
that fits well with the company’s resources is an objective. Of course that thing, 
whatever it is, has to be wanted by the waiting world or target market. Thus 
corporate strategy development is often seen as starting with trying to find a goal 
that combines what we do well (our strengths) with opportunities in the landscape. 
Such opportunities are things that the market is calling for, but are not being yet 
provided in the form required by any or a sufficient quantity of suppliers. Such a 
matching process has been given the name “SWOT” analysis.81  
If we go back to the notion that a corporate strategy is about a company achieving 
something, we realize that we need to be a little more stringent about what 
precisely it is we want to achieve. This depends in part upon which of the 
stakeholder perspectives we are taking when considering this. We have the 
customer, supplier, shareholder, employee and wider societal perspectives to 
choose from.82 If we take as a base-line, however, that a company, ceteris paribus, 
will want to ensure healthy long term profitability, we can start to consider how we 
best go about ensuring that as a minimum, before we consider other objectives. 
The process of executing the transactions of supplier supplying customer, occur in a 
market.83 The character of that market is important to analyze because, depending 
on some key characteristics, the market will be either a good place or not such a 
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good place for making money in.84 If we are going to make any money at doing 
that chosen “thing” that we do well, not only in the short term, but also in the long 
term, there are a set of factors describing a market that we must observe and 
ascertain. These things are the factors or aspects to a market which will determine 
whether we can do what we intend, and continue making a sufficient profit at it 
over the long term. Such factors have been christened by Michael Porter the “five 
forces” of competition.85  
4.2 Porter’s Five Forces Model 
These five forces determine how intense the competition is for the added value (or 
surplus) generated by the chosen product or service. If a competitor is defined as 
anyone who attempts to force us to relinquish our profit margin to them, either in 
whole or part, the five forces of competition are a classification of the five types of 
competitor for said profit margin (surplus).86  These competitors are suppliers, 
customers, competitors (in the classical sense), potential new entrants to the 
industry and suppliers of alternative products (substitutes for the industry’s 
product). The competitive forces are themselves therefore 
 Supplier power 
 Customer power  
 The power of substitute products 
 The potential power of new entrants 
 The level of competitive rivalry between industry incumbents 
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Each of these five forces gnaws away at the surplus (profits) of market incumbents, 
dependent upon the force’s strength. Figure 9 below illustrates the five competitive 
forces. 























Quite how strong each of these forces is, depends upon the following factors: 
Supplier Power 
The strength of supplier power depends upon supplier concentration and 
the availability of viable substitutes for the supplier’s product. It also 
depends on what percentage of the supplier’s turnover is accounted for by 
supply to the firm’s industry. 
Customer Power 
The strength of customer power depends on customer concentration relative 
to the concentration of industry incumbents, and whether those customers 




The Power of Substitutes 
This is dependent upon the customers’ costs of switching to the alternative 
product. 
The Power of New Entrants 
This is dependent on the barriers faced by new entrants when trying to enter 
the incumbent’s industry. Such barriers may be large investments, obscure 
and difficult to imitate know-how and so on. 
The Level of Competitive Rivalry between Industry Incumbents 
This is dependent upon the level of commitment of the incumbents to 
staying in their industry. Such commitment can be built upon real difficulty 
in exiting an industry caused by so called barriers to exit faced by existing 
firms. It can also be based on psychological barriers to exiting, such as firm 
tradition. Real exit barriers might be de-commissioning costs (if high) when 
closing down or converting a piece of plant. Psychological barriers may be, 
for example, sunk costs.87 In addition, the more homogeneous the product 
and competitors, the greater the intensity of direct price competition.  
4.3 Dealing with the Five Forces 
A fundamental question which will affect the company’s ability to make healthy 
long term profits will be the one of choosing in which market we should compete. 
A company should choose a market in an industry in which the five competitive 
forces above are not so strong that, while an opportunity at first may appear 
attractive, within a short period after market entry, profitability erodes to 
unacceptable levels due to operation of one or several of the five forces illustrated 
                                      




above.88 A fundamental starting point for a strategy is therefore the analysis of one, 
or many, target industries to understand their attractiveness along the lines of the 
five competitive forces. Returning to the question of finding a fit between the 
company’s resources and that thing it would consider doing, a fundamental criteria 
therefore will be the ways in which the firm’s innate resources can be used to 
address each of the five competitive forces in the industry seen as a potential target 
for entry.89 Specifically, can the firm use its resources or strengths to effectively alter 
the working of one or more of the five competitive forces such that it or they start 
working in its favor? Examples might be as follows: 
Supplier Power 
Could the firm credibly threaten to back-integrate into the supplier’s market 
and become a credible competitor to existing suppliers? Alternatively could 
the firm develop a process that effectively downgraded the significance of or 
even replaced the supplier’s product? Corporate size, financial muscle, prior 
experience (know-how) and / or R&D base might be resources that could 
make such a strategy possible. 
Customer Power 
Is the firm able to develop a product that is found both highly desirable by 
the customer base but which is also not imitable by competitors because its 
basic technology is protected by patents? R&D and access to legal resources 
may be key here. 
Power of Substitutes 
Customer centered innovation ensures that we are satisfying the basic need 
better than any competitor or any substitute product. The resources the firm 
may possess to make that a reality may be strong relational skills and strong 
relationships within a network in the market. Here, potent relational skills 
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(including key account management skills) and professional CI programs can 
be effective resources.    
 
 
Power of New Entrants 
Being able to erect barriers to entry is a potent antidote to this type of 
competitor. Examples of such barriers may be high investment costs, the 
tying up by the first mover of all the lucrative distribution channels, or 
difficult to imitate / complex and subtle know how. Particular know-how or 
existing firm activities that allow entry at lower cost than competitors may 
represent the resources needed here. In addition, having attained a volume-
based cost leadership position (economies of scale), new entrants could be 
deterred, as the capacity investment necessary to achieve cost-parity, could 
be uneconomic for new entrants to attempt.90 
The Level of Competitive Rivalry 
The removal of exit barriers will help here. For example, financial resources 
mean that a firm may be able to buy its competitors out. 
In dealing with the five forces, Michael Porter identifies that there are fundamentally 
three basic strategies that will be effective. These three basic strategy types are 
 Cost leadership 
 Differentiation 
 Focus91 
These three generic strategy types are illustrated and defined in figure 10 below: 
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4.3.1 Overall Cost Leadership 
This strategy recognizes that there are such things as a learning curve and 
economies of scale.92 Cost savings are generated by both aspects based on volume. 
The existence of a learning curve ensures that the more parts you make, the 
cheaper the parts will get, with the last one being made more cheaply than any of 
the previous ones. This is due to the accumulation of experience. On the other 
hand, the existence of scale economies says that there are efficiency gains available 
as a result of more sophisticated machinery and rationalized work practices if one 
can manufacture more per unit of time, up to some ceiling volume or production 
rate. Above that rate, scale diseconomies (problems of management) can start to 
                                      




take their toll.93 The strategy of overall cost leadership recognizes these two factors, 
and tries to be the first to market and to serve as broad a market as possible in 
order to reap the rewards of a head-start and greater volume than anyone else. 
This strategy is so potent because, if successful, the company practicing this 
strategy has the lowest unit production cost, ceteris paribus, and is thus in a 
position to win any pricing battle. The general knowledge of this can be enough to 
discourage others from even attempting such a battle, which brings its own 
advantages.   
4.3.2 Differentiation 
The differentiation strategy involves the company attempting both to produce a 
product that satisfies the needs of the market more completely than that of any of 
its rivals, and to formulate a solution that achieves this that is somewhat unique. 
This company’s products are not a copy of their competitors’ and attempt to be 
plain and simply better at meeting customer’s needs. The reason for this approach 
is to shift the focus of competition away from being based purely on price. Given 
that the majority of the needs being satisfied are the same for all competitors in 
the market, this type of competitor’s unit cost must be in touch with that of its 
competitors (close), even if not the lowest. This strategy, however, cannot be used 
as an excuse not to be looking at one’s cost base. A successful differentiation 
strategy is extremely tough to execute, and the product benefits must be clear and 
not immediately copy-able by the competition – which is difficult in this age of low 
cost rapid prototyping technology.94  
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The focuser looks at a market as a whole and tries to segment it into homogeneous 
portions. The reason for this is that there will be differences in customer 
requirements between customers in one market, and while the broad market cost 
leaders and broad market differentiators try to address the needs of the market as 
a whole. Theoretically therefore, a “focus” strategy focusing on the needs of only 
one particular portion, may well be able to deliver a product better suited to that 
one group in the market than any of the broad market offerings, and thus come to 
dominate that particular segment.95 The focuser will be a lower volume supplier and 
thus will not enjoy the economies of scale of the broader market suppliers. The 
additional value to their segment such suppliers bring must be valued by that 
segment more highly than the likely price penalty incurred by customers buying 
their products. 
Michael Porter identifies that any strategy that a company chooses must be a 
variation on one of the above three big strategy themes, taking into account the 
requirements laid down in each strategy theme. Porter describes any strategy that 
does not firmly fall in to, and fulfill the key requirements of, one of the three 
approaches described above, as being doomed to failure over the longer term. 
Porter’s reasoning for this is that any strategy that does not firmly sit in and fulfill 
the requirements of one of these strategy types will be extremely vulnerable to 
other company strategies that do fall firmly into one of the three strategy 
categories described. Companies with such indefinite strategies are described by 
Porter as being “stuck in the middle” and in danger of being out-priced, out-
differentiated and out-focused by its rivals.96 The true source of strength of 
competitors that do develop strategies that firmly sit in one of the three camps, is 
that such definiteness starts to turn the workings of the five competitive forces in 
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that competitor’s favor, or at least starts to neutralize the worst effects of some of 
the forces that tend to not act in their favor. By the same token, the lack of 
definiteness of the “stuck in the middle” competitor, is that they are the most 
vulnerable to the worst workings of the five forces, and fail to turn the workings of 
any of the five forces to their favor. An example might be barriers to entry. A 
competitor successfully following a cost leadership strategy may have developed 
such an economies of scale advantage that there is neither the incentive nor the 
unsatisfied demand left in the market to warrant an actual or potential competitor 
adding such a scale-matching level of capacity.  
A good corporate strategy is therefore something that gets us where we want to 
be, by getting us somewhere that appreciates what we are good at, really needs a 
product that those particularly good resources we have can make, and which 
respects the principles, articulated by Porter, of the five forces of competition, by 
attempting to turn some or all of the five forces’ workings to our advantage. 
4.4 The Value Chain 
What has been described so-far are the big principles on which any sound strategy 
must be based. If a strategy fails to take account to any of those principles, its long 
term chance of survival is reduced. The question still remains however, “how does 
the company go about putting any of these big generic strategy types into 
practice?” The answer according to Michael Porter is an analysis of the “value 
chain”.97 
The value chain is the mechanism by which value is generated through a chain of 
linked processes. Such processes operate, either directly or indirectly, upon inputs 
to transform them into outputs of value to a customer. The processes, as 
                                      




mentioned, are either of a direct (primary) or an indirect (supporting) nature. Direct 
processes are processes in the value chain that directly impinge upon the 
manufacture of the good or service. Examples of direct processes might be in-
bound logistics or manufacturing (operations). Indirect processes are processes 
supporting the effectiveness of the direct processes. An example of this might be 
research and development, which through its efforts, can develop a product that is 
easier to manufacture (helps the operations process) and is easier to sell (helps the 
marketing and sales process). Figure 11 below illustrates a generic value chain: 
                   
Figure 11.“The Value Chain”   Porter M., Wettbewerbsvorteile, 1998, S.66 
 
The direct activity groupings are inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, 
marketing and sales, service. Each of these broad groupings could contain any 
number of individual departments. Alternatively, parts of a single broad grouping 
could be spread across more than one department. The indirect activity groupings 
are firm infrastructure, human resource management, technology, procurement. The 
indirect activities are shown as extending across the length of the value chain as 





4.4.1 SWOT Analysis  
A value chain can be developed at the level of the individual company. However 
there is also a value chain at the level of an entire industry.98 The industry value 
chain is an agglomeration of the value chains of each of the industry participants. 
The ground rules of an industry can be found embedded in the industry’s value 
chain. The particular ways in which activities are carried out, and the necessary 
investments to operate in that fashion, represent the status quo of the industry. The 
strengths and weaknesses of an individual company, generated in so-called SWOT 
analysis, are strengths and weaknesses in a firm’s value chain in relation to the 
industry value chain.99 An understanding of the implication of differences in an 
individual firm’s (versus the industry’s) value chain, can only be achieved by 
referencing the effect of that difference on the customer’s value chain. This is so 
because, according to Porter, the roots of strategic effectiveness, be the result a 
cost advantage or product benefit, can be found in what he calls “value chain 
linkages”.100 Potential advantages to the customer that can be offered by our value 
chain vs that of the general industry, are the so called “opportunities” in SWOT 
analysis and are embodied by such potential value chain linkages. 
 
4.4.2 Value Chain Linkages 
The key to the effective use of value chains is to search both the company’s and 
the customer’s value chains for linkages. These linkages can be between activities 
within the firm’s own value chain and between activities in the firm’s and the firm’s 
customer’s value chain. Such linkages are influences that the one activity has on the 
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other. As already mentioned, activities within research and development 
(technology) can make the manufacturing of a product easier (operations). This 
would be an example of a linkage within a firm’s own value chain. However, more 
effective transfer of demand information from the customer’s manufacturing 
planning (operations activity at the customer) directly into the supplier’s 
manufacturing planning (operations activity at the supplier) can reduce inventory 
both at the supplier (outbound logistics) and the customer (inbound logistics), thus 
cutting costs for both.101 This latter would be a linkage between the value chain of 
the supplier and the customer. It is the effectiveness of the supplier’s value chain 
relative to the effectiveness of that of the general industry in supporting the 
customer, which highlights the firm’s strengths and opportunities. Value chain 
differences between the firm and that of the general industry should therefore be 
evaluated in terms of the effect of these differences on the customer’s value chain. 
“Differenzierung entsteht also im Grunde dort, wo ein Unternehmen durch seinen 
Einfluß auf die Wertkette des Abnehmers für ihn einen Wert schafft.”102 
 
4.5 The effect of strategy on corporate structure 
According to Chandler, firm structure follows strategy.103 According to Porter, when 
a linkage between two activities in a value chain is discovered, the two activities 
should be coordinated so that the overall outcome of those linked activities is 
optimized. The challenge is that the activities in question may be partly located in 
one department, and partly located in another. This, according to Porter, can be 
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particularly the case for indirect activities. For example the procurement activity can 
be located across most of the functional departments of a company. Given the key 
to developing strategic advantages is the coordination of these value chain 
linkages, then, at least for the linkages to be found within a company’s own value 
chain, “Vielleicht kann ein Unternehmen die Abgrenzung seiner Einheiten besser auf 
die Quellen seiner Wettbewerbsvorteile abstimmen und für ausreichende 
Koordinierung sorgen, wenn es seine Organisationsstruktur an der Wertkette und 
den Verknüpfungen innerhalb dieser Kette und mit Lieferanten oder 
Vertriebskanälen ausrichtet.”104Michael Hammer and James Champey in their book 
„Re-Engineering the Corporation“ confirm that “[p]eople involved in a process look 
inward toward their department and upward toward their boss, but no one looks 
outward towards the customer. The contemporary performance problems that 
companies experience are the inevitable consequences of process fragmentation.”105 
It is thus the re-integration of processes within the value chain which supports the 
coordination of such linkages.106 A tool for monitoring the implementation of 
measures designed to coordinate linked activities in the value chain is the balanced 
scorecard (BSC) [see section 5.1]. The causes of problems are often to be found in 
processes, not in individual departments, and as such the BSC tries to mirror the 
fact that companies are viewed today more like integrated systems rather than a 
structure of individual departments. “Die Organisation in Informationszeitalter 
arbeitet mit integrierten, die herrkömmlichen Geschäftsfunktionen übergreifenden 
Geschäftsprozessen.”107 The way organizations are managed has to reflect this, and 
specifically management reporting must focus on the linkages that drive corporate 
success. Such linkages are the causal relationships that get the business where it 
needs to be. Traditional management reporting has however militated against this 
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as “Nutzer des Berichtswesens blicken in die Zukunft, während das Berichtswesens 
von heute in die Vergangenheit schaut. Obwohl Informationen über die 
Vergangenheit nützliche Indikatoren für zukünftige Leistungen sind, brauche 
Unternehmen auch vorwärts gerichtete Information.”108 
4.6 The Essence of Strategy Development 
In his 1994 paper, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning”, Henry Mintzberg 
identifies that strategic planning as a corporate activity, had not delivered the 
results hoped for. Mintzberg puts this down to the process of strategy development 
being confused with both data analysis and strategic implementation. According to 
Mintzberg, a strategy is a vision of a possible future. It is the end result of a 
creative human process involving the synthesis of a vision out of a multitude of 
different inputs.109 Such inputs include personal experience, serendipitous events, 
learning and analysis. He lays bare what he describes as the three fallacious 
assumptions behind “formal” strategic planning. These are: 
 The fallacy of prediction 
 The fallacy of detachment 
 The fallacy of formalization 
The fallacy of prediction is that the discontinuities that are often the basis of 
strategic change can be predicted with any confidence. Mintzberg states that 
history shows us that any form of prediction of the significance of coming events 
and thus the early identification of the discontinuities that lead to strategic change 
are extremely difficult, and mostly unreliable.110 Such prediction is the key skill of 
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management, but to have any chance of success must be a continuous process and 
not part of a formal strategic planning process. Indeed one of the reasons why 
continuous competitive intelligence gathering is important is that “Diskontinuitäten 
in der Umwelt zu entdecken, v.a. sie unternehmensspezifisch in ihrer Auswirkung 
richtig zu interpretieren, stellt sich als erfolgsentscheidende Fähigkeit  des 
Managements heraus.”111 
The fallacy of formalization and detachment is the idea, that the formation of a 
strategic vision can be achieved by anyone, including formal strategic planners, as 
long as that person is supplied with sufficient data analysis. “Formalization implies a 
rational sequence, from analysis through administrative procedure to eventual 
action. But strategy making as a learning process can proceed in the other direction 
too. We think in order to act, to be sure, but we also act in order to think.”112The 
implication here is that only those who carry out the running of the business, i.e. 
the line managers, have the opportunity to “learn by doing” and as such should be 
the source of the strategy.113 Strategic planning is a process of synthesis, most 
complex in nature, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative inputs and requiring 
knowledge. Mintzberg concludes that a formal system can never replace the spark 
of intuitive genius that can combine all these inputs into a strategic vision. He also 
concludes, that it is likely that only strategic practitioners will have a chance of 
combining all these necessary qualities in one person. 
Mintzberg does not negate the idea that formal planners have a role to play in the 
strategic planning process. He simply says that the roles they have to play should 
be external to the creation of the strategic vision. He sees two areas in which they 
can contribute: 
1. In the provision of thoughtful and thought provoking analysis of business 
data 
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2. In the programming of an already conceived vision and turning that vision 
into action plans114 
The principal research scientist at Yahoo! Research, Duncan Watts, states “grasping 
the limits of your intuition is not the same thing as saying the world is completely 
unpredictable”115. The role of the data analyst in terms of uncovering relationships 
and mechanisms within a business model is emphasized by Watts. Such 
mechanisms provide clues to the existence of linkages discussed earlier and such 
analysis “change[s] …the mental models that…decision makers carry in their 
heads.”116Thus the analyst can provide inputs to the strategist based on analysis 
(and in the case of e-businesses like Yahoo!), experimentation also, that helps to 
guide and inspire the strategist. 
 
4.7 How KAM and CI Gathering contribute to Strategic Planning 
4.7.1 The Contribution of KAM 
In the case of the supplier’s most important accounts, it is the KAM who must, at a 
minimum, make key inputs into the vision, if not make the vision themselves. Key 
account management is all about holistically managing a chunk of the firm’s 
business with one of the firm’s largest accounts. The key account manager is a 
business leader within the firm, in their own right.  
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As discussed in section 2.1.3, studies have identified the following as the key drivers 
in achieving KAM effectiveness and KAM program success:   
 A deep understanding of the key account’s business  
 The support of the key account program by the KAM’s own top 
management 
 Relationship coordination skills both in the relationship between supplier 
and key account (relationship-specific assets) and within the supplier itself, 
(sales person navigation (SpN) skills and esprit de corp)  
 The existence of a master-plan for the development of the account 
 Having the KAM report directly to top management and not being part of 
the ordinary sales organization   
All aspects of the KAM role can therefore be described as strategic. Solely the role 
reporting structure recommended by the literature would indicate that the KAM 
role is strategic. However all the other processes, in which the KAM should be 
involved to be a success, imply a strong influence on strategy formation. Indeed 
one of the main reasons for failure of the KAM role is leaving the reporting 
structure a purely operational one, with reporting being into ordinary sales 
management.117 Referring back to the words of Mintzberg “We think in order to act, 
to be sure, but we also act in order to think.” It is the “learning by doing” aspect of 
the KAM role which should provide an important feedback into strategic thinking. 
An example of a specific task that illustrates the strategic role of KAM and the input 
it can make into product strategy, is in product development, and specifically in the 
form of the “lead user approach”. 
                                      





4.7.1.1 A Specific KAM Activity Supporting Strategic Planning – The 
Lead User Approach 
The lead user approach is a special example of VOC. It is the voice of an account 
considered of significant strategic importance for the industry as a whole. As such it 
links the KAM and six-sigma approaches, with the latter’s focus on CTQs (factors 
critical to quality). Heike Kurzmann in her paper “Kundenintegration in 
Innovationsprozesse” recognizes that classic market research, even primary market 
research, has failed to be reliable in helping to find companies the innovations 
needed for the future. “Durchschnittskunden [...]immer vor dem Hintergrund Ihrer 
"Real-World Experience" Bedürfnisse und potenzielle Lösungen identifizieren. Es fällt 
diesen Kunden extrem schwer sich von diesen Erfahrungen zu lösen und sich neue 
Produkteigenschaften oder -anwendungen vorzustellen. Eine zu starke Orientierung 
an diesen Kunden könnte die Innovationskraft der Unternehmen sogar negativ 
beeinflussen.”118 Because of the dual difficulties of finding adequate market 
information, and when primary market research of a more classic nature is carried 
out, getting any really innovative insight, she advocates the so called “lead-user” 
approach. According to Kurzmann, “Lead User, definiert [man] als Nutzer eines 
Produktes, deren aktuelle Bedürfnisse den Bedürfnissen der breiten Masse am Markt 
für Monate oder Jahre voraus sind, bezeichnet von Hippel (1986, S.791) auch als 
"Need-Forecasting Laboratory" für die Marktforschung.”119 In the market for 
industrial business to business products the lead-user approach would involve 
identifying customers within the industry with a track record themselves of being 
both innovative and successful at being innovative. The lead user approach would 
indicate in industrial business to business markets trying to partner with particular 
customers who themselves could be given the label “lead-users”. These companies 
have their finger demonstrably on the pulse of their markets, and as such will lead 
us forwards in an orientation that may well set us up to be ahead of our 
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competitors in the supplier market.120 Herrmann, Tomczak and Befurt have 
identified that there are four possible combinations of innovation as shown in 
figure 12 below:    























Innovations can be innovative in terms of the basic technologies that are used in 
their manufacture, or they can be innovations in terms of the features and benefits 
that they bring to customers (the added value). The level of novelty of the 
innovation can be something perceived more by the business, or it can be 
something primarily perceived by the customer, or it can be seen as a novelty both 
by supplier and customer. The four possible combinations of these two aspects of 
novelty are shown in figure 12 above. Of the four possible combinations of the two 
types of novelty, named incremental product innovation, customer oriented product 
innovation, company oriented product innovation and radical product innovation, it 
is customer oriented product innovation that requires, according to Kurzmann, the 
integration of a lead user into the new product development process.  Basic 
technological innovations are more rare and cannot be relied upon to regularly 
appear and form the basis of a clear advantage versus the competition’s offering. 
                                      




Kurzmann identifies the potential that lead users embody in terms of finding new 
product characteristics, highly visible to the user and which are perceived by the 
user as a considerable step forwards. It is such customer oriented product 
innovations that are the target for achievement when one involves lead users in the 
new product development process.121 Key accounts are the source of such 
strategically important lead users, and it is the management of those lead-user 
relationships that is the responsibility of the KAM. This is an example of how the 
KAM makes an input directly into the development of strategy. 
4.7.2 The Contribution of C.I. 
Competitive intelligence makes a contribution to strategy formation both indirectly 
through the contribution to KAM described in section 3.1.4, and directly by helping 
managers deal with the problem of uncertainty in strategy formation. Courtney, 
Kirkland and Viguerie in their article “Strategy under Uncertainty” identify that when 
developing strategies, most strategic decisions require input of at least some 
information that can be known (or found out) with certainty and the making of 
some assumptions about uncertain outcomes, this uncertainty they label “residual 
uncertainty”.122  
 
4.7.2.1 Residual Uncertainty 
The nature of residual uncertainty they categorize into four levels: 
Level one 
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“The residual uncertainty is irrelevant to making strategic decisions at level one, so 
managers can develop a single forecast that is a sufficiently precise basis for their 
strategies.”123 
Level two 
“The future can be described as one of a few discrete scenarios at level two. 
Analysis can’t identify which outcome will actually come to pass, though it may help 
establish probabilities.”124 
Level three 
“A range of potential futures can be identified at level three. A limited number of 
key variables define that range, but the actual outcome may lie anywhere within 
it.”125 
Level four 
“A number of dimensions of uncertainty interact to create an environment that is 
virtually impossible to predict at level four. In contrast to level three situations, it is 
impossible to identify a range of potential outcomes, let alone scenarios within a 
range.”126 
Strategic change migrates from what Courtney, Kirkland and Viguerie call an 
“adaptor posture” in level one through to a “shaper posture” in level four. The 
adaptor concentrates on making adaptive changes to its offering as typified by the 
lead user approach to product development described above. The shaper looks to 
influence the structure of the entire market, trying to influence the very ground 
rules of the five forces described in section 4.2.127 
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In all but “level one” residual uncertainty, the role of CI in making the risks at each 
level manageable is emphasized. In level two and three scenarios, the emphasis is 
placed upon identifying so called “trigger variables” that should be identified and 
monitored. Trigger variables are the signs that would indicate the industry is 
settling on one out of the possible ranges of scenarios.128 At level four residual 
uncertainty “situation analysis[…] is highly qualitative.[…]managers need to catalog 
systematically what they know and what it is possible to know.”129 This latter task is 
also the responsibility of a CI function. 
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5 Alignment between Customer and 
Supplier 
Alignment between customer and supplier is really the central theme of this paper. 
If alignment ends up meaning that there is a fit between the strategy of the 
supplier and the strategy of the customer, in that the supplier is focusing on the 
things that are really relevant and important to the customer and the customer 
needs things that correspond to the core competencies of the supplier, then the 
customer and their supplier are well aligned.130 One could also say that there is a 
strategic fit between customer and supplier. Key account management is all about 
understanding what needs to be done in the customer-supplier relationship so that 
those things are done that are needed to make a potential alignment turn into an 
actual one.131 The emphasis in the last sentence is, though, on the word “potential”. 
There first has to be an analysis that leads to an informed decision about which 
customers are the right ones for us to be working with, that is to say, the 
customers that have “potential”. As will be discussed in section 9, customer 
relationship management (CRM) contains tools for evaluating this, but in addition 
an important input into this also comes from competitive intelligence (CI). As 
previously discussed, competitive intelligence is an important input into strategy 
development, and an important precursor to specific activities of key account 
management.  
We will now review a framework or philosophy that promotes customer-supplier 
alignment, and within which all the activities of the company, (our focus here being 
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key account management and competitive intelligence), are carried out. The 
framework or philosophy in question is that of six-sigma.    
5.1 The Role of Six-Sigma 
Six-sigma is at once both a corporate philosophy spanning all corporate activities 
and processes, and also a statistical approach to measurement. Professor Armin 
Töpfer summarizes the dual aspects of six-sigma as shown in table 3 below.132  
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Six Sigma is a quality management philosophy and tool. In regards the many facets 
to quality management that are now documented, Professor Töpfer places six-
sigma in a hierarchy as shown in figure 13 below. 
























TQM/EFQM (total quality management/European Foundation for Quality 
Management) represents an ideal model of business excellence. The TQM/EFQM 
defines the drivers of quality and business success. It does this by defining enablers 
of quality (drivers) and quality results from various perspectives and sets standards 
for each enabler and result category. Out of this ideal model the balanced 
scorecard (BSC) approach places the drivers of quality and targeted results into the 
context of a company specific strategy. It uses the firm strategy to prioritize and 
define causal relationships between each driver, and categorizes the drivers and 




perspective, internal business processes perspective, customer perspective and 
financial perspective) as shown in figure 14 below.133  
                
Figure 14: The Balanced Scorecard (Source Kaplan, Norton) 
For each of the drivers of quality, it defines so called key performance indicators 
(KPIs). KPIs are goals and performance measures for each of the drivers. As such the 
BSC is a controlling tool. 
Six Sigma is all about how one goes about improving the performance of KPIs. The 
EFQM and BSC work in partnership, taking quality ideals (EFQM) and translating 
them into an ever-more company and strategy specific form (BSC). “Six sigma 
erweitert und verstärkt diesen Zweiklang durch eine kompromisslose Konzentration 
auf die Umsetzung. Durch klare Ziele und Meilensteine wird das geförderte 
Werttreiber-Niveau realisiert.”134 Six sigma takes the task of improving a particular 
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KPI, analyses the process delivering the performance into steps and classifies them 
according to which of the four perspectives above they belong. It does this in three 
main steps: 
 An “outside-in” analysis is undertaken whereby the “voice of the customer” 
(VOC) on the particular value driver in question is heard via a questionnaire. 
Here the factors critical to quality from the customers standpoint (CTQ’s) are 
ascertained. This is followed by an “inside-out” analysis whereby current 
performance in the CTQ is evaluated, along with the level of core 
competency (needed to meet customer requirements) in the CTQ factor, 
ascertained. 
 Each six sigma project uses so called SIPOC analysis to highlight each 
process step and categorize them in the order supplier, input, process, 
output and customer. Here standards are set for input, process and output 
metrics such that the required performance in the CTQ factor is reached. 
 The performance standards for each process step are set in accordance with 
CTQ factor values and corporate strategy.135 
The result of this three stage process is that the vision of quality (from the 
customer’s standpoint) has thus been broken down from the over-arching model of 
business excellence (EFQM model) and turned into improvement action-plans in 
each of the firm’s value-adding processes.136  
The voice of the customer, and the thus determined CTQ’s should guide the 
development of every value-adding process within a company. “Everything can be 
looked at in terms of a process, whether it’s handling paperwork or an idea or a 
customer call or a hard product. “That is probably one of the biggest concepts for 
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people to grasp.””137 ”We need to determine the starting points with a clear, 
quantitative understanding of customer satisfaction, which is typically accomplished 
through surveys.”138 “Six Sigma is a philosophy of continuous improvement and 
measurement to drive the direction of goals. Its concepts are not earth-shaking. 
Talk to your customers (those customers can be firm internal or external), and find 
out what the defects are. Work on your big errors first. Try to decide how they 
happen and how you can permanently correct them.”139 
Key accounts are by definition the company’s most important customers. They are 
given this status partly on grounds of their strategic importance to the 
development of the business. The six sigma philosophy underlines the importance 
of listening to such customers, and it is the key account manager’s responsibility 
that that listening occurs throughout his or her entire organization. 
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6 KAM in the Context of 
Relationship Management 
6.1 Relationship Management 
6.1.1 The Various Starting Points for the Analysis of the Firm 
In order to generate an understanding for the context in which discussions about 
what are important for the well being of the firm can develop, it is important to 
first survey the various basic viewpoints from which a firm can be viewed. This will 
be done by briefly reviewing three of the most important – the classical, the 
behavioral and the resource based views. The oldest and still deeply embedded 
viewpoint is the classical view. Here the firm is seen as a profit maximizing 
organization operating in a market. If the market in which it is operating is properly 
functioning, according to classical theory, there will be perfect mobility of factors of 
production and each agent of the market will have access to perfect information. 
Each actor will be perfectly rational and will maximize their utility. The existence of 
the firm as an organization is seen, within the classical view, primarily to be 
founded on so-called incompleteness of contracts, where a recognition is made that 
a perfect static contract that reflects all contingencies is, in the real world, some-
what impossible to formulate. The dynamic situation of the business environment 
therefore requires flexibility and “"The nature of the firm", to borrow the title from 




to incentive problems.” 140 Rather than all economic activity being undertaken by 
atomized perfectly competing entities, the early contributions made to the study of 
the firm and industrial organization made by such figures as Adam Smith did 
though recognize the need for cooperation “For example, Smith's (1776; 1795) or 
Babbage's (1832), discussions of factory production implicitly invoked team-
production”141. However the classical view, despite coming to this important 
conclusion, did not develop this idea further, but rather concentrated on division of 
labor and a more agglomerated view of entire markets to provide its insights and 
recommendations, which means it is not suited as an intellectual framework in 
which to treat the development of inter-firm relationships and their management, 
an important part of this paper. Never-the-less, the classical school states that “It is 
generally recognized that knowledge problems are behind all interesting aspects of 
economic organization, and that the major function of, for example, firms is to cope 
with the economic problems introduced by changing, partial, tacit, complex, 
asymmetrical, etc. knowledge.”142 This latter statement is of fundamental importance 
to this paper. The behavioral view of the firm sees real world economic activity in 
the form of bargains struck by coalitions, the firm being an example of a coalition. 
The bargains that are struck are rarely perfectly profit maximizing but represent 
acceptable compromises reached within a framework of bounded rationality. The 
concept of bounded rationality leads to less than efficiency maximization, and 
“organizational slack[that]permits firms to survive in the face of adversity. Under the 
pressure of a failure (or impending failure) to meet some set of demands on the 
coalition, the organization discovers some previously unrecognized opportunities for 
increasing the total resources available.”143 The behavioral view recognizes the 
market driven optimization process forced upon most firms. However its analysis of 
the mechanisms through which this comes about has its main focus on intra-
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company political forces, making it unsuitable as the main focus for looking at 
inter-company relationship development. In contrast, the resource based view (RBV) 
of the enterprise maintains that sustained competitive advantage results from the 
interplay between the resources that are there within a firm, and the managers' 
abilities to use those resources.144 The asymmetry of resource possession between 
firms becomes one of the foci for the development of inter-firm relationships, key 
account relationships being a subset of such relationships. 
6.1.2 The Resources Based View of the Firm 
The resource based view of the firm takes up a different position to that of either 
the classical or behavioral views of the firm. Specifically there are two major 
assumptions in the classical viewpoint which are relaxed, those being that resource 
allocations between companies are identical, and that perfect factor mobility 
between firms is a given. Resource allocation between firms in the RBV view can be 
asymmetric, and factor mobility is not a given but instead factors are “sticky”. As 
such, “this model assumes that these resources may not be perfectly mobile across 
firms, and thus heterogeneity can be long lasting. The resource-based model of the 
firm examines the implications of these two assumptions for the analysis of sources 
of sustained competitive advantage.”145  
A sustained competitive advantage according to this view is attained if the 
following requirements for the resource in question are met: 
1. The resource must be valuable in the sense that it exploits opportunities 
and/or neutralizes threats in a firm’s environment 
2. The resource must be rare amongst a firm’s current or potential competitors 
3. The resource must be imperfectly imitable 
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4. There cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for the resource that are 
valuable but neither rare nor imperfectly imitable146 
Barney focuses on the strict requirements a resource must meet to be a source of 
sustained competitive advantage. One of the most stringent requirements is that, 
rather than a resource only being imitable by competing firms after a long period, a 
resource that endows its owner with sustained competitive advantage may not be 
at all imitable by current or potential competitors. Only fundamental or structural 
changes in the industry’s environment can make such a resource lose its relevance. 
Barney also focuses on the type of resource that qualifies as imperfectly imitable. 
He identifies particular causes of a resource being imperfectly imitable. These 
causes are 
 Unique historical conditions under which the resource is acquired 
 Causal ambiguity regarding the link between the resource and the sustained 
advantage 
 The resource itself is socially complex 
The important aspect of Barney’s argument is that the path followed by the firm in 
achieving its sustained competitive advantage, via an acquired resource, is 
impossible to retrace by a competitor. This is the case because either the conditions 
under which the resource was acquired are impossible to reproduce, or because the 
firm managers themselves do not fully understand the link between the resource 
and their own business’s advantage or because a factor such as firm culture is close 
to impossible to duplicate. Barney illustrates using the example of information 
technology and specifically management information systems. He doubts, for 
instance, that the possession by a firm of computer systems per se can ever be a 
sustained advantage. He identifies though that the interface between such systems 
and management is the key to their effectiveness, a concept he describes as system 
“embeddedness”. The exact nature of such “embeddedness” or interface can be 
both causally ambiguous and socially complex. A component of management 
                                      




information systems such as an effective competitive intelligence system could 
display all the characteristics of such an embedded system, and which particularly 
efficient functioning may well represent a sustained competitive advantage. Given 
the nature of such defined resource based sustained competitive advantage “firms 
cannot expect to "purchase" sustained competitive advantages on open markets[...]. 
Rather, such advantages must be found in the rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-
substitutable resources already controlled by a firm[...].”147 If a company must 
acquire a particular resource endowing such a sustained competitive advantage, the 
only logical conclusion that can be drawn from the conclusion of the RBV, is that it 
must do so by seeking out a relationship with the company that already possesses 
such sustained advantage.   
6.1.3 The Relational View of the Firm 
The relational view of the firm is a logical extension of the RBV, and derives from it. 
While the RBV concentrates on intra-company resources, the relational view 
recognizes that “a firm's critical resources may extend beyond firm boundaries.”148 
The nature of transactions between firms can be either purely market-based, arms-
length in nature, or a more intimate cooperative relationship can develop. Arms 
length, purely commercial transactions can be imitated by most any competitor, 
and so such buyer-supplier relationships based on such transactions cannot be the 
source of sustained competitive advantage. By contrast “idiosyncratic inter-firm 
linkages may be a source of relational rents and competitive advantage.”149 Dyer 
and Singh in their 1998 paper recognize that the valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable 
and unique facets of inter-company relationships that become sources of relational 
rents and sustained competitive advantage are rooted in the following categories: 
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 Investments in relation-specific assets 
 Substantial knowledge exchange 
 The combination of complementary but scarce resources 
 Lower transaction costs than competitor alliances150 
Dyer and Singh place great emphasis on the socially complex and causally 
ambiguous aspects of such inter-company relationships as the root of their 
sustained nature and innate advantages. “Strategic alliances allow firms to procure 
assets, competencies, or capabilities not readily available in competitive factor 
markets, particularly specialized expertise and intangible assets, such as 
reputation.”151 Dyer and Singh’s main thesis, based on empirical research, is that 
“productivity gains in the value chain are possible when the trading partners are 
willing to make relation-specific investments and combine resources in unique 
ways.”152 Investments in relation-specific assets lead to “lower total value chain 
costs, greater product differentiation, fewer defects, and faster product 
development cycles.”153 Substantial knowledge exchange “generate[s] rents by 
developing superior interfirm knowledge-sharing routines.”154 The combination of 
complementary but scarce resources “when combined with the resources of the 
partner, result[..] in a synergistic effect whereby the combined resource 
endowments[are]more valuable rare, and difficult to imitate than they had been 
before they were combined.”155 An added effect compounding the advantages of 
cooperative alliances, is that “the ability of firms to generate relational rents by 
combining complementary resources increases with the firm's (1) prior alliance 
experience, (2) investment in internal search and evaluation capability, and (3) ability 
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to occupy an information rich position in its social/economic networks.”156 The 
existence of complimentary resources is however not sufficient to ensure their 
effective combination, and compatibility of firm cultures is also a prerequisite for 
effective relationship building. Lower transaction costs in cooperative rather than 
competitive alliances are attained by “aligning transactions with governance 
structures[this having]an advantage over competing transactors who do not employ 
efficient governance mechanisms.”157 The crux of the issue being here that 
relationship governance based on mutual trust, goodwill and transparency will be 
both more flexible to changing environmental conditions, have lower set-up and 
maintenance costs and tend to appreciate with time (mature) rather than depreciate 
(run-out in jurisdiction) when compared to written formal legal agreements. Given 
the crucial nature of the roles involved in key relationship management, the choice 
of key account manager should involve asking the question, is the candidate for the 
role capable of managing a business the size that the key account can eventually 
become? This question can be broken down into sub categories: 
 Is the candidate mentally agile enough to understand the customer’s 
business as well as the customer? 
 Does the candidate have relational skills of a caliber to effectively manage 
multi-faceted and complex relationships? 
 Is the candidate capable of reporting to the firm’s top management?158 
6.1.4 The Alternative to the Relational View – The Transactional View 
The transactional view of buying behavior sees the focus of analysis being the 
individual buying transaction. The development of a longer term commitment 
between buyer and supplier that extends beyond the horizon of an individual 
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buying decision is not explicitly examined. The first structural model illustrating the 
influence factors on institutional (business to business) buying decisions was that 
developed by Webster / Wind in 1972. Their structural model is illustrated below in 
figure 15. 
 
























In the Webster/Wind model, “the four classes of variables determining 
organizational buying behavior are individual, social, organizational and 
environmental.”159 Webster and Wind describe the focus of the analysis in their 
model as follows. “The organizational buying process is a form of problem-solving, 
and a buying situation is created when somone in the organization perceives a 
problem - a discrepancy between a desired outcome and the present situation - 
that can potentially be solved through some buying action.”160 The interplay of 
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objective and subjective factors, as well as a sweep of the environmental factors 
and internal firm requirements is undertaken as inputs to the decision. The decision 
itself is not taken by one person but is a joint decision taken by a buying center. At 
bottom though, the Webster / Wind model focuses on individual buying decisions 
and ignores the longer term implications that the development of a relationship can 
have on institutional buying behavior. As such it illustrates well the transactional 
approach to business to business selling. 
6.1.5 Types of Key Relationship 
The keyness of certain relationships with external actors has already been 
introduced in the context of KAM. We shall now look at the subject of relationship 
keyness more generally. A business to business relationship is considered key when 
“the access to or the combination with the resources held by these external actors 
are a condition to[the company’s]mere existence.”161 Ivens et al identify that, in an 
attempt by companies to augment their offering and get away from commodity 
status, there is a tendency to add to their core offering with complementary 
products or services in order to add-value and protect their product from 
commoditization. Surrounding a product with complimentary services, or integrating 
other products in with our core offering succeeds in doing this. Ivens et al propose 
that as a result though, the main lesson for business markets is that they “must 
move from a product-centric logic to a customer-centric logic”162. This is to say that 
the bundle of goods and/or services we wish to supply has to be defined by the 
customer if it is to add-value to the customer. This naturally raises the dependency 
of the business on external actors, such as key suppliers and customers, and as a 
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result, raises the importance of relationship management. In the IT sector, Ivens et 
al distinguish between system suppliers and system integrators. “A systems seller is 
a “vertical integrated firm that produces all or most of the product and service 
component required for integrated solutions provision.[…]A systems integrator is “a 
prime contractor organization responsible for the overall system design and 
integrating product and service components supplied by a variety of external 
suppliers into a functioning system””163  
A company’s performance depends upon its relationships with a limited number of 
partners.164 As a result “companies understand[relationship]keyness as a major 
challenge”165. One of the main focuses for key relationships is in the promotion of 
strategic change. Dittrich et al. in their 2007 paper Strategic repositioning by means 
of alliance networks recognize that there are two main types of alliance 
relationships, those that support so-called exploration strategies and those that 
support exploitation strategies.166 Exploration strategies imply looser, often R&D 
based alliances in new technological capabilities. They are in that form to allow 
“Learning by doing” and experimentation, the essential components of double-loop 
learning. If the relationship is not proving to be bearing the fruit hoped-for, it’s 
somewhat looser and lower commitment nature allows it to be broken-off without 
too much loss. In contrast, exploitation strategies imply relationships of a much 
closer nature involving higher commitments (investments) by both parties. Here 
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single loop learning is aimed for such that such benefits as economies of scale can 
be closely exploited and operational relationships optimized.167 
6.1.6 The Management of those Key Relationships 
The identification of key relationships and their management are at one linked. 
“Alliances require managers who can think and manage in ways that differ from 
what is required to manage a functional unit or business.”168 The nature of key 
resources that are being sought are only really recognizable by practitioners deeply 
involved in the field. That is why “key relationships and key relationship 
management as the management of such relationships are dialectically linked. The 
concept of keyness encompasses both of these dimensions of key relationship 
management.”169 A subtle combination of soft and hard management qualities are 
required. In contrast to the networking - entrepreneurial – intrapreneurial skills 
associated with scoping-out the potential for new relationships, once those 
relationships are becoming established, research has shown that a good deal of 
structure and formalization, especially when it come to communication, benefits key 
business relationships.170 Ivens et al identify four areas where they claim a dedicated 
strategic alliance function adds value in the management of strategic relationships. 
This is because such a dedicated function 
 Improves knowledge management efforts 
 Increases external visibility 
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 Provides internal coordination 
 Eliminates both accountability and intervention problems171 
In the case of key relationships with customers there are some specific do’s and 
dont’s related to both protection of company know-how and also the avoidance of 
boxing oneself into developing products that are suited solely for one particular 
customer or market niche. Enkel et al identify the precautionary measures that 
should be taken as follows 
 The selection of the right customers (preferably lead users) to be integrated 
 The choice of the right methods of integration 
 The choice of the right time and place for integrating customers into the 
innovation process 
 The provision of the right prevailing conditions (IP management, staff 
management, incentive systems among other things), and 
 The choice of the right project in which the integration of customers creates 
a genuine added value.172 
Erickson and Rothberg differentiate between industries with high levels of 
intellectual capital to structural capital and industries where the ratio is lower. 
Specifically they identify that consumer product industries tend to have a higher 
ratio of intellectual capital to structural capital than is the case generally in business 
to business industries. This also will have implications regarding the levels of 
protection of IP that is necessary in an alliance.173   
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6.2 Customer Relationship Management 
In thinking about the role that key accounts make to the development of a 
business it is important to ground the discussion about what a key account is 
within the subject of customer relationship management (CRM) generally. 
“Customer relationship management aims at establishing long-term relationships 
with customers in order to gain insights into what matters most to customers.”174 
This is not done as an end in itself but as a means for developing long term 
benefits. These benefits can be classified under three headings: 
 Greater security for the business 
 Greater growth for the business 
 Greater profitability / return on investment175 
Originally the development of longer term relationships with customers was seen, 
as part of this philosophy, as an end in itself. Through a relatively undifferentiated 
approach, lack of linking of CRM implementation to corporate goals, and a lack of 
thinking through of its implementation, the results (in terms of tangible benefits to 
the corporate bottom-line attributable to CRM implementation) were often meager 
or non-existent.176 Because of this, customer relationship management as a concept 
has gone through four phases of development. From its roots in the 1980’s, where 
in the start-up phase of CRM as a concept, ideas were generated around the basic 
idea that there were advantages in developing longer term relationships with 
customers, there developed a second phase in the 1990’s where the development 
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of concrete CRM concepts, tools and implementation strategies occurred. The third 
phase has involved the integration of the CRM concept into an IT strategy, the 
setting of standards and measuring success. After a period of re-assessment of the 
achievements of CRM, a re-launch of the CRM concept has in a fourth phase 
occurred. Here a more discriminating approach is establishing itself whereby the 
type of relationship to be developed is being varied depending on customer type 
and potential. The value that each customer can bring is being measured against 
their contribution towards meeting corporate goals.177 The resultant ranking in 
importance, or classification, of customers provides the back-drop to deciding 
which of a company’s accounts are key. 
6.2.1 Choosing Key Customer Relationships 
In contrast to the transactional view, the customer relationship view of marketing 
looks at the value a customer represents to a business through the entire life-time 
of that customer relationship. A thorough understanding of what that value is, is 
rarely achieved, and very often substituted by such imprecise or erroneous 
measures as a customer’s current turnover ranking with the supplier, total market 
share or market image.178 In contrast a thorough analysis of the value of the 
account for the supplier is needed, and a ranking of the supplier’s customers 
required, such that decisions taken on where marketing expenditure is to be 
invested have a chance of being correct. 
6.2.1.1 Customer Life-Time Value 
Measuring the value that a customer represents to its supplier over the life-time of 
the supply relationship begs the questions, what are the benefits that customers 
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bring to suppliers? Naturally it is simplest to use turnover or profitability as the 
measure but such financial measures on their own do not provide the complete 
picture. Damm and Monroy in their 2011 paper recognize that, true to the spirit of 
the balanced score-card approach, investments in marketing are aimed at bringing 
both tangible and intangible benefits.179 Examples of the intangible benefits are the 
customer referral value, the customer influencer value and the customer knowledge 
value.180 The referral and influencer value brought to the relationship by satisfied 
customers, operates in the form of word of mouth (WOM) or viral marketing181, and 
has been the subject of much research. It is the job of the KAM in the form of a 
“VIP Engagement Manager” as Brown and Hayes put it, to manage those influencer 
relationships in business to business markets.182 Other intangible effects though 
such as “customer led innovations offer multiple benefits such as reduced time-to-
market, reduced cost-to-market or increased fit-to-market (Piller, 2006). Those 
benefits do have an impact on financial measures, even though they might impact 
in an indirect way.”183 A multi-dimensional measure of customer life-time value 
(CLV) is needed that takes such indirect influencers of future corporate performance 
into account. 
6.2.1.2 Situation in Practice and Pitfalls 
The customer life-time value calculation in its simple form is “the sum of cumulated 
cash flows - discounted using the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) – of a 
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customer over his or her entire lifetime with the company”184. In terms of its use it 
is a relatively simple equation. What is complicated is obtaining the input data that 
means that the resultant value assigned to a customer is of any use in decision 
taking on subjects such as marketing spend allocation or key account classification. 
The situation is well illustrated by a simple example. Even at the level of decision 
taking about the viability of such a simple marketing activity as a mail-shot, Amoy 
Yang in his 2005 paper identifies that taking the right decision on the viability of 
mail-shots depends upon the ability to calculate a life-time-value (LTV) for a group 
of customers. Without such a value, the long-term-value break-even response rate 
(LTV BE% Reps) cannot be calculated and the true value to the business of the 
campaign is unknown. The difference between the normal break-even response rate 
(BE% Reps) and the LTV BE% Reps is that while the BE% Reps compares the normal 
value of initial orders from new customers with the expenditure associated with the 
campaign, the LTV BE% Reps looks at the life-time value average for customers 
(LTVA) compared to campaign expense. If accurate LTVA data were not available, 
marketing managers would be missing out on opportunities as such “a far-reaching 
benchmark allows one to make an immediate strategic decision and gain 
profitability in the long run.”185  
6.2.1.3 Compound Measures – The role of Business Intelligence 
The kernel of the problem is, how do we go about taking other measures of value 
into account when evaluating the importance of customer relationships, other than 
yesterday’s turnover and profit figures? The problem is at once both a question of 
data collection and data management. The quantitative historical data available 
within the company must be supplemented or enriched with insight. The backward 
looking nature of available quantitative data within the business must be given a 
context in which to develop hypotheses about the future such that through 
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interpretation, the quantitative data becomes the basis for informed decision 
making. The process of collecting such internal (quantitative) and external 
(qualitative) data as well as its thoughtful combination leads to the generation of so 
called business intelligence. “Business intelligence (BI) bezeichnet einen integrierten, 
unternehmensspezifischen, IT-basierten Gesamtansatz zur betrieblichen 
Entscheidungsunterstützung.“186  The basis for making informed and economically 
correct decisions is insight.  Business intelligence should provide a basis of future 
insight, with the data developed within its generating processes being of a richness 
and structure that allows informed interrogation of that data. The economic 
quantitative data being generated by the business itself is being generated more 
and more from the operative level systems within an e-business structure. Via data-
warehouses and data-marts, operational level transactional information is structured 
such that via such analytical systems as OLAP (on-line analytical processing), or 
processes like data-mining, aggregation and interrogation of the data can be 
undertaken to look for patterns or trends. In a similar fashion, qualitative 
environmental data is entered, structured, edited and analyzed within a data-
warehouse for qualitative data about the business’s environment. Such so-called 
competitive intelligence combined with insights from aggregated internal 
quantitative data from the business can form, if well edited, analyzed and 
combined, business intelligence. It is such business intelligence that serves as the 
basis of the generation of composite measures of customer life-time value (CLV). 
This is because through the enrichment of quantitative with qualitative data, one is 
in a position to recognize that “customers offer more than their financial value and 
that indirect effects play a crucial role that need to be accounted for.”187 These 
indirect effects include word-of-mouth (WOM) advocacy and customer-led 
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innovations with associated benefits of reduced time-to-market, reduced cost-to-
market or increased fit-to-market.188    
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7 Strategic Networks 
7.1 What is a Strategic Network? 
In section 4, we looked at the background to strategy making. In that section, some 
of the important background factors that had to be considered in the process of 
developing strategy were: 
 What is the structure of the background market in which we will be 
operating (five forces model)? 
 What specific unfulfilled needs does the customer have that we can fulfill 
better than anyone else in the industry? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of our value chain, relative to the 
industry’s value chain, in relation to the identified needs of the customer, 
and embodied by potential value chain linkages?  
 How do we know which customers we can most profitably serve? 
 How do we make the most of (or leverage) our strengths and compensate 
for weaknesses? Specifically, how are the value-chain linkages (that will raise 
our performance and help us serve the customer better) to be organized?  
 Who is to organize and manage such relationships (linkages)? 
In dealing with answering some of these questions a strategic (alliance) network is 
quite often seen as the answer. A strategic network consists of various strategic 
alliance (dyadic) relationships. The relational view of the firm already explored in 





7.1.1 Definition of a Strategic Alliance 
A strategic alliance is a relationship with an external actor put in place (according to 
Ivens et al.) “because the access to or the combination with the resources held by 
these external actors [is] a condition to [the company’s] mere existence.”189 
Theoharakis et al state “[alliance]relationships are defined as the “mutually oriented 
interaction between two reciprocally committed parties”[…]This definition 
emphasizes the concept of mutuality and thus[…]neither firm would be able to 
achieve the same performance in isolation”190. Möller and Rajala in their 2007 paper 
place strategic alliances within a wider perspective. They see alliances developing 
not as one-on-one dyadic relationships, but within a network of many alliances, or 
within a (strategic) business network.  
7.1.2 Multiple Strategic Alliances as Network 
The developments of such networks is “one of the fundamental shifts in the 21st 
century[…]from a dyadic perspective of interorganizational exchange relationships 
towards a network perspective of value creation involving different types of network 
organizations.”191 Möller and Rajala go on to define three types of business 
networks as follows: 
 Current Business Nets 
Goals 
o To achieve high systemic efficiency through value activity integration 
and coordination 
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o Provide integrated customer offerings by combining complimentary 
resources 
Characteristics 
o Relatively stable, multi-tiered structure 
o Prominent level of codifiability of value activities and knowledge 
o Relative transparency and level of determination of value activities 
 Business Renewal Nets 
Goals 
o Renewal of existing offerings and business processes 
o Production of customer-driven / specified solutions (cooperation with 
a lead user would fall into this category) 
Characteristics 
o Coexistence of stability and incremental change 
o Specialized knowledge embedded in persons, communities of 
practice and routines – partly tacit and partly explicit 
o Temporary in nature 
 New Business Nets 
Goals 
o Influencing emerging field 
o Creating new dominant technology solutions 
o Creating new commercial applications 
Characteristics 
o Radical change involving change of existing value systems and 
creation of new ones 
o Uncertainty concerning emerging knowledge structures and value 
activities 
o Dispersed vaguely held ideas192 
                                      




7.2 The Importance of Strategic Networks to Modern Strategy 
Development 
Dyer and Singh in their 1998 paper suggest that “productivity gains in the value 
chain are possible when trading partners are willing to make relation-specific 
investments and combine resources in unique ways.”193 Dyer and Singh go on to 
say that “competitive advantages of partnerships[…]seem to fall into four categories: 
1. Investments in relation-specific assets 
2. Substantial knowledge exchange, including the exchange of knowledge that 
results in joint learning; 
3. The combining of complementary, but scarce, resources or capabilities 
(typically through multifunctional interfaces), which results in the joint 
creation of unique new products, services or technologies; and 
4. Lower transaction costs than competitor alliances, owing to more effective 
governance mechanisms.”194 
These points explain why a network of strategic partnerships provides at least some 
of the answers to the issues raised in the development of corporate strategy. Points 
1, 2 and 3 address the need to deal with the five competitive forces, make the most 
of our strengths and compensate for any weaknesses and identify specific 
opportunities. Points 1 and 4 help address the need to both develop and effectively 
manage the value chain linkages that result. 
7.2.1 Networks as Part of the “New Approach” to Marketing 
There has been a shift in focus of the business organization, as noted in Section 
7.1.2. Ivens et al note that the firm “must move from a product-centric logic to a 
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customer-centric logic.”195Theoharakis et al state that “research in the marketing 
domain has shown that firms are more successful when they focus on customer 
needs[…]and[…]that customer orientation is the most central component of market 
orientation, and in some instances the two concepts seem to be identical[…].”196 
In their 2011 article entitled “We’re all Marketers Now”, French et al describe how 
the task of marketing (“Marketing ist eine unternehmerische Denkhaltung. Sie 
konkretisiert sich in der Analyse, Planung, Umsetzung und Kontrolle sämtlicher 
interner und externer Unternehmensaktivitäten, die durch eine Ausrichtung der 
Unternehmensleistungen am Kundennutzen im Sinne  einer konsequenten 
Kundenorientierung darauf abzielen, absatzmarktorientierte Unternehmensziele zu 
erreichen.“197) has been seconded out to almost every department in a company. 
The need for this has been driven by the need to manage the „total customer 
experience“198. The customer touch points in the age of internet-enabled e-business 
have dramatically increased, and as a result, the need to manage the customer’s 
experience at each of those touch points has also dramatically increased with this 
development.  The process of interaction with customers has also fundamentally 
changed with the relationship becoming two-way whereas it used to be primarily 
one-way (from supplier to customer) and, as a result, was relatively passive. With 
the advent of the internet, and specifically Web 2.0 functionality, the customer is 
taking a far more active role in the relationship. This is a double-edged sword. 
Customers on the one hand are becoming far more active in the co-development199 
and co-production200 of their products, but on the other are becoming far more 
vociferous if they do not get satisfaction from the relationship. Marketing has 
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become much more than the development of a message which is then fed to the 
customer. The message is developed jointly between customer and supplier and is 
developed out of day-to-day real life interaction. The much savvier customer no 
longer believes what he or she has not personally experienced and they pass their 
experiences on to the rest of the market via web-based social networks and forums. 
As such the customer becomes also co-creator of the marketing message.201 The 
customer experience must therefore be coordinated. It is no good the sales team 
saying one thing and the operations people doing something else. The message 
must be given with one voice. The marketing mentality must be spread throughout 
the company, with “a premium be[ing] placed on problem-solving and strategic 
marketing skills.”202 French et al. see this more interactive approach developing 
across the range of relationships with “deeper partnerships with external vendors, 
customers, and perhaps even competitors[being the norm]and a bigger role for 
data-driven customer insights.”203 Also, the increased need for relationship 
coordination again reinforces the need for KAM, as this was identified as a key 
driver in the increased use of KAM. 
 
7.3 The Importance of KAM in the Management of Strategic 
Networks 
These latter points connect back to section one’s discussion of the roles of KAM 
and e-business. The requirement for greater coordination of key customer 
relationships was shown to be one of the drivers for an increased need for KAM. In 
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addition it was shown that studies confirm that e-business implementation 
promotes and supports coordination efforts. It therefore can be seen how the 
change in marketing’s role and the rise of strategic networks raise the need for 
effective KAM. 
7.3.1 The Role of the KAM in Partnering 
Walter Powell in his 1999  paper “Trust-based forms of governance” highlights the 
role that “boundary-spanning” personnel have to play in the establishment and 
maintenance of strategic alliances. “Sydow (1991) argues that managerial functions 
change when organizations become involved in alliance networks. As firms pursue 
external collaborations, they attend more to interorganizational politics and assign 
greater importance to boundary-spanning personnel.”204 Key account managers are 
a prime example of such boundary-spanning personnel who have the job of 
coordinating the alliance relationship between supplier and customer. This leads us 
to our second hypothesis. 
7.3.1.1 Hypothesis H2: The establishment of a successful key account 
program is an important driving factor in the later 
development of a successful strategic network in which the firm 
takes up membership and operates. 
The KAM role is a formalization of the relationship with a key customer. As argued 
in section 7.2.1, effective KAM is an important aspect in the development of 
strategic alliance networks. If we take the formalization of the management of such 
alliance relationships as meaning, in the case of the customer-supplier relationship, 
the establishment of a formal KAM function, then the study performed by 
Daugherty et al and described in their 2006 paper helps us to answer the question 
as to whether hypothesis H2 holds or not. 
                                      




Daugherty et al surveyed 55 companies. The respondent company descriptive 











Figure 16 below shows the respondent company profile207 
                                      
205 Daughtery et al, Is collaboration paying off for firms? 2006, S.68 
206 Daughtery et al, Is collaboration paying off for firms? 2006, S.69 






Figure 17 below shows the respondent title profile208 
 
Figure 17. 
“In order to identify potential differences based upon the level of formalization, the 
respondent firms were divided into two groups: one of low formalization and one 
of high formalization. A summed score was calculated for each participant company 
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Level of formalization210 
 
Table 6. 
“As each of the nine items had a potential score from 1 to 7, total possible scores 
ranged from 9 to 63. A cut-off point between 50 and 51 was the natural break-
point, and was therefore used to divide the respondents. The 28 firms (50.9%) with 
scores of 50 or below were designated as less formalized, and the remaining 27 
firms (49.1%) with scores of 51 or above were assigned to the high formalization 
group.[…]In absolute terms, the high formalization group had higher performance 
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Comparative analysis – low vs highly formalized firms212 
               
Table 7. 
The Daugherty et al study therefore appears to confirm hypothesis H2. It shows 
that formalization of a relationship with supply chain partners is a key ingredient to 
the success of such collaboration. Between customer and supplier, an important 
example of relationship formalization is the KAM function. 
                                      




8 KAM, Strategic Networks & 
Strategic Execution 
8.1 The Effects of Strategic Networks on Firm Performance 
The advantages of relationships between cooperating firms on firm performance 
were identified by Dyer and Singh as: 
 Investments in relation-specific assets 
 Substantial knowledge exchange 
 The combination of complementary but scarce resources 
 Lower transaction costs than competitor alliances213 
The question is therefore, does the involvement of companies in strategic networks 
lead to enhanced firm performance? If this is the case, what precisely is the 
mechanism for this, and how do KAM and CI play their parts in such a mechanism? 
The answering of such a question is of course not trivial. Various attempts have 
been made and the intention of this section will be to introduce a variety of studies 
that have had this question as their focus, introduce their findings and analyze the 
variables and moderating factors involved. To begin the analysis, it makes sense to 
choose an existing framework in which to explain such a link. One of the main 
studies that investigated the effect of alliance network membership on firm 
performance was that of Theoharakis et al.214 Theoharakis et al place their analysis 
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within the framework of the so called “service-profit chain” (SPC) proposed by 
Heskett et al.215 We shall start by looking at what the SPC is and proposes.  
 
8.1.1 The Service-Profit Chain (SPC) 
The service-profit chain (SPC) as proposed by Heskett et al. posits that there is a 
linkage between profitability, customer loyalty and employee satisfaction, loyalty 
and productivity. “Profit and growth are stimulated primarily by customer loyalty. 
Loyalty is a direct result of customer satisfaction. Satisfaction is largely influenced by 
the value of services provided to customers. Value is created by satisfied, loyal, and 
productive employees. Employee satisfaction, in turn, results primarily from high-
quality support services and policies that enable employees to deliver results to 
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One of the important insights provided by Heskett et al’s paper is that it is the 
enabling of employees to do a good job, by providing for them the management 
support and infrastructure necessary, which initiates raising of the firm’s service 
performance, customer loyalty and subsequently profitability.  Theoharakis et al. 
extend the SPC by one further linkage, namely that of the firm’s ability to both link 
with customers and also to build successful relationships with strategic partners.217 
Specifically, they posit that “employee satisfaction and loyalty has a positive impact 
on the firm’s linking capabilities”218(see Theoharakis hypothesis H3a below) and that 
“employee satisfaction and loyalty has a positive impact on the firm’s capability to 
build successful relationships with strategic partners.”219 (see Theoharakis hypothesis 
H3b below)  
 
 
8.1.2 KAM as a Key Component in the SPC 
These concepts link back to the primary factors, identified by Workman et al., for 
ensuring that KAM is a success: 
 Getting the choosing of the right customers with which to develop key 
account relationships right 
 Having an understanding of the key customer’s business 
 Top management commitment to the key account relationship 
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 Human aspects / corporate culture / team working 
 Having a master plan 
 An open relationship220 
These key factors for KAM effectiveness all depend upon the stage being set by 
management for support of the KAM role. The activity pro-activeness and ability to 
pick the right relationships, as well as the development of a master-plan imply the 
existence of a formal and well resourced KAM role, as well as top management 
support of the KAM and KAM empowerment. As previously identified, it also implies 
the setting-up and resourcing of a professional CI function to support, among other 
things, the KAM role. The key step of enabling, by management commitment and 
support, effective interaction with customers and strategic partners, would therefore 
imply the appropriateness of the SPC as an intellectual framework in which to 
analyze this. Figure 19 below illustrates the modified SPC proposed by Theoharakis 
et al., as the framework for their study: 
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8.1.3 Other Positive Factors Leading to Enhanced Firm Performance in 
Networks 
There are various measures that could be taken of firm performance when 
searching for a link between firm membership within a strategic alliance network 
and firm performance. The two that have been looked at in some detail are ROA 
(return on assets), an accounting measure of firm performance, and firm market 
value, a valuation based on the share price of the company giving a market based 
capitalization of the company. Both performance measures have their advantages 
and disadvantages. The advantage of the accounting method ROA is that it is not a 
subjective method and as such is more comparable between companies. The 
disadvantage is that one is not comparing like with like. Potential increases in the 




the investment. One is comparing a numerator (profit) related to and generated 
from past investment decisions with a denominator based on forward looking 
investment decisions. In contrast, the market-based estimate of firm value looks at 
the capital value of discounted future cash flows and as such has the advantage 
that future oriented investment decisions are being compared to future returns. The 
disadvantage is that the market measure is more subjective and will also be more 
industry specific, making general comparisons between companies more difficult.221 
Cravens et al. as a consequence mention the balanced scorecard also as a valid tool 
to encourage congruity between performance measures, management measures 
and methods and the forward looking nature of the management task, particularly 
in the context of planning and managing alliances.222  
The core, however, of a strategic alliance is the generation of shared resources and 
assets.  It is these relationship specific assets than can be the basis of increased 
competitive advantage because of their relationship specificity and resulting 
inimitability. A penalization of such assets by using an inadequate performance 
measure that would show the generation of new assets as having reduced a short-
term accounting measure such as ROA, should therefore be moderated by the use, 
in addition, of a market-based measure, in order to get a more rounded view of 
performance. There is though a potential benefit from strategic alliances in regards 
ROA performance. The effect involved runs counter to the one just described, and 
involves the higher utilization of existing (pre-alliance assets). This would have the 
opposite effect on the accounting ROA measure, in that the numerator (profits) 
could be increased with a proportionately smaller increase in the denominator 
(assets). This comes about from the realization of synergy from the alliance where 
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existing assets of both partners can be put to better effect for both parties resulting 
from the alliance, asset utilization for both parties being increased.223 
Dyer and Singh recognize that “an information-rich position within a network, 
therefore, provides a firm with additional information about the nature and degree 
of accessibility of the complementary resources of potential partners."224The 
involvement in a strategic alliance provides access to information that can 
advantage the partner receiving the information. This can be as a result of exposure 
“to an industry’s technologies, as well as to the industry’s players and their 
relationships,[such that the recipient firm]can become aware of who can create 
value for it and how that value can be created”225 Arendt and Amit give the further 
example of how entering a strategic alliance with a competitor could act as a clever 
pre-cursor to a decision to acquire them, the alliance experience generating the 
best and closest due diligence information possible.226Therefore, in general, one can 
say that a potential benefit from being in a strategic alliance is the access to 
superior CI. 
A further advantage is the access to certain assets held by one of the potential 
alliance partners, by the other. An example might be reputation. A small but 
innovative biotechnology start-up may have developed a superior product, but 
lacks the market presence that would allow it to successfully market its innovation. 
This lack of presence could involve the subjective risk associated with dealing with a 
relatively unknown entity in a high risk sector such as pharmaceuticals, concerns 
around the short or long-term financial stability of a start-up, or the lack of 
sufficient power or influence with other marketing channel members (distribution 
channels) that would be necessary to ensure sufficient access to customers. In this 
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case, a strategic alliance combining for example a biotechnology start-up’s R&D 
capital with the reputation capital of an established pharmaceutical company lends 
the necessary legitimacy of the established partner to the less established 
partner.227 
8.1.4 Moderators of the Effect of Strategic Networks on Firm Performance 
A number of studies have been carried out into the effects of membership in a 
strategic alliance network and firm performance. Notable examples are the studies 
by Antoncic and Prodan228, Theoharakis et al.229 and Park and Cho230. However all of 
these studies suffer from the phenomenon known as self-selection. This is the 
phenomenon where-by the participants in the study are assumed to have chosen 
their strategies randomly. However the participants are all firms engaged in alliance 
activity. This can introduce bias into the sample because there is a chance that the 
firms that involve themselves in such alliances are all firms that may have a higher 
level of performance anyway. Thus higher performing firms have “self-selected”, and 
the generally higher levels of performance in the sample are not necessarily a result 
of alliance activity, but could have been present anyway. The study performed on 
the effect of alliance on firm performance by Arend and Amit231 is one of the few 
studies that specifically controls for self-selection.  
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Walker et al in their study of how industry networks form identify several partly 
opposing and partly reinforcing phenomena affecting network formation. They 
identify that network density can have a positive effect on the ability to form and 
manage alliances via the phenomenon they describe as social capital. Firms 
occupying a relatively densely populated position in a network “have access to 
social capital, a resource that helps the development of norms for acceptable 
behavior and the diffusion of information about behavior.”232 Such a network is 
tending towards being “closed” in that most of the firms have relationships of some 
sort. This leads to rigidity when it comes to forming new relationships. It could 
however help to ensure that, via policing against opportunistic behavior, alliances 
tend to be more successful. In contrast, regions of the industry with high levels of 
rigidity or sparse populations of firms may exhibit holes, or opportunities to broker 
or form alliances. Such holes are regions where potential value chain linkages have 
not been exploited. So although social capital can make the management of 
relationships easier, the existence of holes represents opportunities to exploit 
linking potentials with higher returns. Here the quality of CI can play a part in the 
identification of such opportunities. Whereas regions of network density represent 
areas of mutuality and thus greater certainty, network holes represent areas of 
higher risk but potentially higher rewards. Which strategy is emphasized is 
dependent upon the industry. Industries with greater degrees of arms length 
transaction may favor the exploitation of holes, whereas industries where close 
engagement of partners and long-term relationships are the norm may favor the 
more conservative approach of operating within denser more “closed” networks.233 
Park and Cho identify that market competitive intensity is a mediating factor in the 
degree to which an alliance can have any significant effect on performance. Ceteris 
paribus, if the number of competitors in a market is raised, the degree of 
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competitive intensity increases, and thus the ability to exploit the advantages 
associated with alliances, identified at the beginning of this section, is diminished.234   
Likewise, industry stability is also identified as a mediating factor in an alliances 
effect on firm performance. Specifically, in industries where changes in market share 
are greater and more frequent, ceteris paribus the probability that an alliance will 
lead to a greater change in market share of the alliance member will be greater.235 
The higher the industry growth rate, ceteris paribus the greater the positive effect 
on firm performance of an alliance.236  
Increased levels of coordination have seen to be associated with higher levels of 
success in strategic partnerships. In particular, increased levels of face to face 
communication between partners has been identified as a particularly effective 
method of problem resolution and associated with higher levels of performance of 
companies in partnerships.237 Again, here the contribution potential of KAM can be 
seen. 
Cravens et al identify the importance of a clear identification of the strategic reason 
for the alliance, the setting of objectives in the form of a customized balanced 
scorecard, and the monitoring and communication of the results. Much like KAM, 
the laying out of an objective and a plan for the cooperation is of critical 
importance as the degree of effective coordination of the relationship is highly 
correlated with success.238 
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8.1.4.1 Hypothesis H3: Companies operating in successful strategic 
networks remain in growth and growing profits for longer 
consistent periods than companies in the same industry and of a 
similar size that do not. 
All four studies identified by the author in section 8.1.4 confirm that membership in 
a strategic network positively influences firm performance measured in terms of 
profitability or return on assets (ROA). However it is only the study by Arend and 
Amit, as a result of the study’s controls for self selection, that is able to confirm that 
there is an improved performance for companies in a particular industry that 
engage in alliances over similar firms in the same industry that do not.239 
8.1.4.2 Arend and Amit Study 
The data sample used in the Arend and Amit study “consists of the full population 
of US firms in the areas of (1) computer programming, data processing, software, 
and systems, (2) computer equipment and peripherals and (3) computer 
semiconductors, circuit boards, and components (SICs 737, 357 and 367 
respectively) in COMPUSTAT that had more than US$10000 in revenue over the 
years 1989-1993. There were 1047 firms recorded, 287 of which had at least one 
strategic alliance in research and development or marketing and distribution, as 
recorded in the ITSA database.”240The key findings from this study were: 
 Firms with greater levels of firm capital are more likely to engage in alliance 
activity. 
 After controlling for self-selection, alliance activity has a significant impact 
on firm performance as measured by the market value of the firm. 
 Large firms with slack tended to dominate alliance activity. 
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 Controlling for self-selection, firms that chose to partner, generally 
experienced value creation, but at return rates below the firm’s average 
return rates. 
 It appears that the firms choosing alliance activity would have been worse 
off without such activity. 
 Firms that generally under-perform because of their resource sets can use an 
alliance to enhance their resource utilization, thereby improving their 
performance. 
 Larger firms in alliances experienced better market value and worse 
accounting returns performance when compared to those that did not 
choose to ally. 
 As a firm stretches to more distant applications, it gets lower value from 
factors specific to core activities. Since market measures recognize any value 
creation that exceeds its accompanying risk, diversification that creates value 
appears as beneficial to firm performance. 
 Large firms may be more likely to engage partners in order to pursue 
business opportunities outside its core activity, and the firm applies less firm 
specific factors – which is in effect, diversification. 
 Higher core-business returns reduced activity; that implies alliances are 
diversification. 
 It appears that alliance activity is self-selected and apparently entails future 
expected value creation but with early reduced accounting returns.241 
                                      




9 Conclusion and recommendations 
for future research 
It has been shown in this paper that there is a link between CI, KAM and effective 
corporate strategy making. Studies have been identified that support at least some 
of the relationships postulated in the mind-map. What this paper shows is that:  
 The heart of strategy is not the planning process, but the grasping of a 
vision of the firms future. This vision gets turned into a plan of action by the 
planning process, but the planning process is not the developer of corporate 
strategy. The strategy is born with the vision. 
 The vision isn’t generated by disengaged professional planners but by 
business practitioners, in the thick of running the business and developing 
strategic relationships. 
 The nourishment for the spark of insight that is the “visioning” process at 
the base of strategy making is the feedback from the market in the form of 
CI and VOC. 
 Raising the quality of corporate strategy is not about getting hold of the 
planning process and reforming it, it is about concentrating on information 
inputs and strategic execution. A firm can “kick-start” the virtuous circle of 
strategy illustrated in section one by getting professional CI and KAM 
functions organized and set-up in their companies. 
Recommendations for future research would be 
1. Establishing in one study the nature of the link between CI, KAM, Network 
participation and firm performance. Some understanding of the causality of 
this chain and also other accompanying mechanisms that will also have an 




2. A study of the management structures most suited to managing the CI-
KAM-Strategic network triad, including the way of organizing knowledge 
management most suited to aiding this triad work productively together. 
3. A study of how the most effective key account managers can be most 
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